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Review paper

Amir Krpić

IMPACT OF THE BALKAN WARS (1912/13) ON THE SOCIETIES IN SOUTH SLAVIC LANDS OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

This paper discusses the immediate consequences that the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) had on the societies in the South Slavic lands of Austria-Hungary. It represents an attempt to summarize the previous results of research on various issues related to the consequences of the Balkan Wars in these lands individually. The focus was on finding common characteristics, as well as peculiarities regarding the impact of the wars on societies in the Slavic south of the Monarchy. In this sense, the focus of attention was on the national question, the political scene, the way of governing, and the economy. It stands out that the Balkan Wars were the spark that ignited the flame of nationalism in the south of the Monarchy, within the framework of the Yugoslav question. Foreshadowing a new era, these wars were for some an indication of the inevitability of reforming the Monarchy in a direction that would ensure a more favourable position for its Yugoslavs, and for others even an indication of its imminent destruction and Yugoslav unification on a broader basis. At the same time, the wars caused new or deepened existing crises in the lands to the south of the Monarchy, serving as an excuse for its authorities to introduce emergency measures or tighten existing restrictions. While in most of the South Slavic lands, the Austro-Hungarian government faced the united front of those forces that openly expressed their support for the Balkan allies, in Bosnia it greatly benefited from the growing political rift between the two dominant national communities and their political representatives. The wars left negative economic consequences in all lands, and by creating new circumstances, they enabled a different approach to solving the agrarian issue in Bosnia.

Keywords: Balkan Wars; Habsburg Slavs; South Slavs; Austria-Hungary

A handful of books, studies, and articles have been written about the Balkan Wars from different angles and perspectives. Naturally, not all of these publications have been used here concerning the aims and scope of the paper. In writing this article, I have relied on the publications considered most suitable for its purpose, which is summarizing the impact of the wars on societies in the South Slavic lands of Austria-Hungary. In other words, the paper is grounded in those publications that provided the most important and illustrative facts.

Igor Despot (2013) has very systematically described the impact of the Balkan Wars in Croatia and Dalmatia in his book which I have used as a starting point. A valuable paper on the situation in Dalmatia has also been published by Milan Gulić (2013). Both authors have analyzed primarily the writings of the Croatian and Dalmatian press of the time in the context of frontline events and their reflections on the local public. Stjepan Matković (2016) has described the changes in political narratives in Croatia during the Balkan Wars and under their influence. For issues about Slovenian lands, I have relied on the works of Vladimir Prebilič and Blaž Torkar (2013) and Igor Ivašković (2020), who have discussed the impact of war events primarily on the Slovenian political scene. Another interesting contribution I have to mention here, that describes the impact of the wars on society – in this particular case on the situation in Trieste and the fear of war on a wider scale is the work of Sabine Rutar (2020) in which she specifically deals with the fear of people who knew that they would be mobilized for the needs of the war – a fear that has reached its peak with the outbreak of war in the Balkans. Although the paper is based on the attitudes and feelings of a few politically active persons, mostly of a socialist orientation, there is no doubt that such fear existed among many other people in Trieste and beyond alike. No matter how many people welcomed the war euphoria and how much the press and later historiographies celebrated it, this paper actually shows the other side of the coin – the fear for personal existence, both physical and economical, in the case of (being mobilized for) a greater war.

Older generations of Bosnian historians have left us invaluable works on the impact of the Balkan Wars on the situation in the newest province of the Monarchy. In the first place, there is the work of Hamdija Kapidžić (1963) on the state of emergency that was introduced in this land during the Scutari crisis, one of the most heated episodes during the entire crisis in the Balkans. There is also the work of Božo Madžar (1984), who also dealt with the issue of emergency measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the crisis, although in this paper primary attention has been paid to labor associations and their political organizations. Dževad Juzbašić (2000) showed how the wars changed the socio-political settings of the treatment of the agrarian

issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina – the most important internal issue in this land during the entire period of Austro-Hungarian rule. More recently, Amir Duranović (2013) addressed the issue of the increase in political aggressiveness of the Bosnian Serbs during the crisis, especially emphasizing the importance of the military successes of the Serbian army on the mood of the most numerous people in Bosnia and Herzegovina back then. The influence of the Balkan Wars on the political attitudes of the leading Bosnian Muslim politicians of that time, through a short analysis of the contemporary Muslim press, has been published by Fikret Karčić (2017). The question of expatriates, who previously left Bosnia during the Austro-Hungarian rule, and who expressed their intention to return during the Balkan Wars, has been thoroughly studied by Tomislav Kraljačić (1990). Also, for a long time Safet Bandžović (2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2016) has been dealing with the repercussions of the Balkan Wars in terms of the displacement of the Muslim population in the Balkans generally. For the purpose of this paper, of particular importance were those parts of his works regarding the influx of refugees on the territory of Habsburg Bosnia.

Of the publications concerning the general consequences of the Balkan Wars, in addition to the well-known publications, I would like to single out the work of Katrin Boeckh (2016) on the Russian Pan-Slavist movement and its activities during the crisis in the Balkans in 1912/13, in which she highlights the impact of this particular crisis on the rise of Pan-Slavism in Russia. Wolfgang Höpken (2020) has left a thorough analysis of the place of the Balkan Wars in the history of 20th-century-European warfare. Respecting the different views on this issue that others, primarily historians of warfare have left – spanning from claims that the Balkan Wars were marginal in the general history of European warfare to completely opposite claims that they were actually the introduction or the first phase of the world wars – the author explains the hybrid nature of the Balkan Wars by analyzing their four key elements. Further on, Alma Hannig (2020) showed how the war simmering in the Balkans affected the diplomatic relations between Austria-Hungary and its main ally, the German Empire, further complicating the Monarchy's position.

When the Ottoman Empire was invaded by the forces of four Balkan countries in October 1912, little could have been known about how the wars would affect the region and international relations in general. Ottoman Empire was forced out of the Balkans almost entirely, while Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria – and with the second (phase of the) war Romania – gained the upper hand, although Bulgaria

eventually ended up overpowered by its former allies. Despite not being directly involved in the wars, Austria-Hungary has faced significant consequences of these wars.

The Balkan Wars, lasting less than a full year between 1912 and 1913, haven't been just a regional conflict, but a major turning point on an international scale, raising the Eastern question to its peak (Calic 2019b). They were a sort of introduction to 20th-century warfare, a prelude to the First World War, or even its first phase (Hall 2002), though its real place in the history of European warfare is still widely discussed (Höpken 2020). Although the main target of the Balkan allies has been the Ottoman Empire, the motives of the wars haven't been linked just to the Sultan's state, but from a geopolitical viewpoint, the wars have also been a step in the struggle against Austria-Hungary and its ambitions in the Balkans (Ivašković 2020). Moreover, albeit the Ottomans suffered a terrible military defeat, it was the Habsburgs who faced the political defeat and the downfall of its Balkan policies (Redžić 1987), as well as diplomatic disagreements and occasional misunderstandings during the crisis with its main ally, the German Empire (Hannig 2020). Even more, it brought the Dual Monarchy very close to an open war against Russia – where Pan-Slavist activities and sentiments of solidarity with “southern brothers” reached their peak during the crisis – but international diplomacy managed to avoid it (Boeckh 2016). Therefore, the Monarchy's interests have significantly been affected in many aspects, forcing their leading men to try to follow up the war developments by several measures (Juzbašić 2002). The rumours had already started to spread across Europe that after the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary was next in line, as it had failed to solve its internal national question in the same manner as the Ottomans had failed to solve the Macedonian question, and even some Austrians have acknowledged that the Balkan Wars opened the fatal phase of their history (Kolejka 1979).

1. NATIONAL QUESTION

The first and principal reason the Balkan Wars caused so much trouble to the Monarchy was the ethnic composition of the population in its southern lands. Carniola, Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as significant parts of Styria, Carinthia, and the Littoral all had absolute (South) Slavic majority, which in the age of nationalism turned out to be particularly important. As the question of national identity has long been open in the Monarchy's south, and as three Slavic countries gained an outstanding victory in the First Balkan war against the „centuries-old oppressor“ of the Slavs, the heightened turbulences in the South Slavic societies can

be easily understood. The victorious war of the Balkan countries therefore caused huge worries to the Monarchy's authorities primarily due to the deepening of the South Slavic question (Hall 2002). Whether the South Slavic people would unite has become the first-class problem in the Monarchy, often being discussed in the Joint Government sessions, as the war efforts of the Balkan countries against the Ottoman Empire have been understood as taking place under the banner of the liberation of the Slavs from foreign rule (Kapidžić 1963). One government official claimed that „if we don't assist the justified wishes and interests of our Yugoslavs, there might be a problem of them turning into centrifugal forces“ (Kapidžić 1963). In that sense, the wars have accelerated the plans of the authorities to solve the South Slavic question inside the Monarchy (Juzbašić 2002).

Stirring the spirits up, the Balkan Wars brought more radical and aggressive voices in favour of Yugoslavism (Pavlović 2004). Believing that after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary would be forced to solve the question of its Slavs (Prebilič, Torkar 2013), critics have become louder than ever in favour of reforming the Monarchy. One Slovenian political magazine of liberal political orientation wrote that the year 1912 taught Yugoslavs more than all the history books and that the year opened their eyes so they could no longer fall into the traps of Metternichs of Vienna (Ivašković 2020). „The cannons announced the Yugoslavian Easter“ shot out one famous Slovenian supporter of Yugoslav unification in April 1913, expressing the importance of the Balkan Wars for the matter of unification of South Slavic peoples (Prebilič, Torkar 2013: 339).

The South Slavic or Yugoslav question indeed reached its highest point up to the moment. One confidential report from May 1913, submitted to the Emperor claimed (Calic 2019a: 53):

„The South Slavic idea, meaning the idea of the Serbo-Croatian fraternization ... has now reached the highest leadership and ... is not only the solution for all segments of the population in political matters but also in cultural and economic ones as well. This is true not only for Croatia and Slavonia but also for Bosnia and Herzegovina and particularly for Dalmatia, where a revolutionary, antimonarchical spirit has promptly gained ground.“

Furthermore, it has turned from being just an Austro-Hungarian question to being an international question (Kolejka 1979). As that question was virtually the most important question at the moment in the Slavic South, it's understandable why the wars caused so much turbulence in that field, and why historians discussed this particular question more than any other in this context.

The South Slavic question had not been a uniform question with only one way and one target. Intellectuals and national workers have been discussing it far and wide since the mid-19th century in modern-day Croatia and Slovenia. Over time, it has gained a lot of supporters as nationalism kept seizing the hearts and minds of people, but the ways of achieving it have usually been on thin ice, as its proponents mostly favoured the „inner“ solution, i. e. solution inside the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy. Therefore, until the Balkan Wars, the very notion of the Yugoslav question was primarily understood as a need for the establishment of a third state unit inside the Monarchy, next to Austria and Hungary (Ivašković 2020; Matković 2016). That has been the stance of Slovenian and Croat intellectuals more than anyone else, with Vojvodina leaning more toward Serbia, and Bosnian elites only catching the flows led by other centres. Slovenians feared the dissolution of the Monarchy would leave them vulnerable to German and Italian expansionism, while Yugoslav unification led by Serbia would be a step back in economic sense (Prebilič, Torkar 2013). Although the trialist option remained a dominant idea of Croat intellectuals up until the last year of the First World War, the Balkan crisis marked a turning point in changing of political mentality of many intellectuals, even some established politicians (such as Ante Trumbić and Juraj Biankini), but especially the younger generation that saw a violent opposition to the Habsburg imperial idea as more useful than further parliamentary struggles (Matković 2016). The Balkan Wars have also been the turning point in wider acceptance of the Yugoslav idea in Croat lands, not just among the elites, but among the ordinary population as well (Despot 2013). Moreover, due to the political struggle between the parties for influence and support, this idea reached the Croat and Serb peasants in Croatia and Dalmatia (Despot 2013). Affecting the national question(s), the Balkan Wars have stretched the relations between communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well, deepening the gap primarily between Serbs and Bosnian Muslims almost to the abyss, to the point that relations among the two groups mirrored those between warring parties in the wars (Duranović 2013).

With the rapid rise of Serbia and its military victories in the wars, other options have also come to the public scene. Unlike Slovenian and Croatian territories, where the idea of Yugoslavism still had higher support, in Vojvodina and Bosnia-Herzegovina the people (mainly Serbs) favoured the option of Serbian expansion. Moreover, some Slovenians have also favoured the option of cooperation with Serbia. The *Preporod* (“Resurgence”) group was the most prominent in this sense (Prebilič, Torkar 2013). Serbian victories played a role in changing the attitude of at least some people, as expressed by Ivan Hribar. Although he has had a long political career in the Monarchy’s

authorities, he sympathized with Serbia. Her victory in the battle of Kumanovo in October 1912 marked the decisive turning point for Hribar, as he recognized Serbia as the „Yugoslav Piedmont“ (Prebilič, Torkar 2013). In Slovenia, liberals have welcomed the victories of Serbian guns, as for them – and Croat political elites as well – they were guarantees of the inevitability of the reformation of Monarchy on the grounds of equality of nations (Ivašković 2020). Bosnian Serbs were particularly rapturous. One Diet representative has warned the Governor that Serbian victories at Kumanovo (in October 1912) and Bregalnitsa (in July 1913) have overwhelmed Bosnian Serbs up to the point from which they could not return to the status of loyal subjects (Duranović 2013). In Croatia and especially Dalmatia, military victories caused eruptions of joy among both Serbs and Croats (Suppan 1980). They have celebrated it on the streets, singing patriotic songs and anthems of Serbia and Montenegro, and even cheering for their kings. As one author has observed, acclaiming the foreign kings was a voice against the Monarchy, as „long live King Peter“ has had the same meaning as „down with Francis Joseph“ (Gulić 2013). The Serbian military victories have given additional moral strength, particularly to the nationalist youth in Bosnia (Redžić 1987; Milošević, Lukić 2022) and Croat lands (Matković 2016).

However, as the First Balkan War ignited the flame of Yugoslavism, the Second Balkan War, begun in late June 1913, dispersed it to some degree. A war between two Slavic nations has been a blow to Slavic unity and solidarity, causing a partial change of opinion among Habsburg Slavs as well. In Slovenia and Croatia, a part of those who previously supported the idea of Slavic unity started showing aloofness. Their attitudes kept evolving, reaching the point of Slovenian and Croatian peculiarities. Between the end of the Balkan Wars and the start of the First World War, some Slovenians began thinking about Slovenian unity, instead of trialism for the first time (Prebilič, Torkar 2013). Among Croats, the Party of Right has split into two lines, with one favouring Croat unity, instead of wider Yugoslavism (Despot 2013).

2. POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE

Most political parties and political magazines in all South Slavic lands of Austria-Hungary have supported the Balkan allies and their war efforts. There have been just a few exemptions. In Slovenia, one pro-Austrian magazine, following the Monarchy's policy, criticized both the allies and the Slovenian parties and magazines that supported them (Prebilič, Torkar 2013). In Bosnia, Muslim political parties and the general public have opposed too, supporting the Ottoman Empire and Muslims in its

territories affected by the wars. Against the wars themselves were workers', socialist, and social democratic organizations in all lands, following the anti-war policies of the Second International (Prebilič, Torkar 2013; Despot 2013; Madžar 1984; Matković 2016). However, the wars have brought an end to unified workers' organizations, in Bosnia at least, along ethnic lines. The successes of the Serbian army have hugely influenced the Serbs in Bosnia, including workers, pushing them to split from the non-Serb workers and to establish their own political magazine *Zvono* (eng. *Bell*) (Hadžibegović 1980). Also, when the war between Serbia and Bulgaria broke out in June 1913, divisions emerged among the previous supporters: some favoured Bulgaria, others favoured Serbia, while some stood neutral expressing regrets for the war between the two Slavic nations (Despot 2013; Gulić 2013). The Monarchy authorities tried to take advantage of the divisions in order to counter the turbulences on its territory caused by the war developments.

In that sense, Bosnia-Herzegovina happened to be the most fertile field. As it has been stated earlier, Muslims predominantly supported the Ottoman side in the war; a sentiment based on traditional, political, but predominantly religious grounds. Although some youths and progressives have shown solidarity with other Slavs, both Muslim parties and magazines and virtually all Diet representatives stood against the war actions of Balkan countries (Juzbašić 2002). Effectively, it meant that Austria-Hungary could find a common word with the Bosnian Muslims in countering the nationalist flows of South Slavs inside at least this part of the Monarchy. On the other side, Muslims themselves recognized the chance for cooperation. In fact, the congruence of interests of Bosnian Muslims and Austria-Hungary has come out as a major shift in political realities in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Juzbašić 2002). This shift, symbolically marked by the appellation of two Muslim Diet representatives (Duranović 2013), has emerged from a simple understanding of the new conditions in the region. Bosnian Muslims were aware of what had been happening to their fellow Muslims in the territories conquered by Balkan allies and began switching to a pro-Monarchy stance, which has been noticed by some contemporaries (Karčić 2017), including Governor Potiorek as well (Kamberović 2005; Potiorek 2016).

The Ottoman defeat has led to a paradigm change among Bosnian Muslim elites as it has become clear that Muslims had to find a new framework for their survival (Karčić 2017). In fact, the Balkan crisis has made them realize two quintessentially important things: 1) the return of the Ottoman Empire was definitely an illusion – proven in 1908, and now confirmed by pushing the Empire far away from Bosnian borders, 2) an alternative to Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia wasn't the Ottoman

Empire, but Serbia – the very same Serbia whose actions in the south they passionately disliked. This brought huge support for the Monarchy from the Muslims from that moment on, even to the point that it seemed the Muslims preferred war against Serbia, which was also a goal of the war party at the highest level of the Monarchy, including the Bosnian governor Oskar Potiorek. This orientational shift caused Muslims to welcome the First World War as their own war, as they were cognizant that the downfall of the Monarchy would mean Serbian expansion on Bosnia (Duranović 2013).

Public life in Bosnia during the Balkan Wars has been hectic, as Bosnian Muslims and Serbs stood on completely divergent stances (Juzbašić 2002). Local fights haven't been rare. The main stumbling rock between them has been the agrarian question. Rumours about the intrusion of the Serbian army in Bosnia and resolving the question in favour of the peasants, who were predominantly Serbs, have been one of the main reasons for the conflict between the sides. The Balkan Wars haven't created tensions between Serbs and Muslims, as they have been there for decades, but they have heavily intensified them (Duranović 2013). Serb demonstrations in favour of Serbia and the allies have been followed by Muslim counter-demonstrations – the largest being those during the Scutari crisis – in favour of Austria-Hungary, the Emperor, and even the Governor (Duranović 2013; Despot 2013; Redžić 1987). The authorities have taken advantage of the situation, skilfully playing out the politics of ethnic divisions. The governor has even had plans to establish the *Schutzkorps* as additional units of the gendarmerie, made up of the Croats and Muslims, purposely avoiding the Serbs (Kapidžić 1963). Among other measures, this one has been particularly insulting for the Serbs, as they felt both vulnerable and offended by being regarded as disloyal. The governor has aimed to benefit from the ethnic divisions, to deepen the gap between the two main groups in Bosnia, effectively preventing the united actions of the people on the grounds of Slavic unity, as was the case in other Habsburg lands (Juzbašić 2002). To contribute to the complexity of the situation, the position of the Bosnian Croats has been interesting as well. Their urban elites have begun catching the flaws of Yugoslavism, but the peasantry has been still passive (Juzbašić 2002). However, despite general initial sympathies with the Balkan allies on the grounds of Slavic solidarity, the Bosnian Croats – unlike those in Croatia and Dalmatia – haven't been eager to welcome close cooperation with Serbia and their stance has been much more loyalist (Šehić 2024).

Additionally, the wars have caused a wave of refugees, mainly Muslim, returning to Bosnia from the Ottoman territories lost in the battles against Balkan allies (on the

details of the persecution of Muslims during the Balkan Wars see: Bandžović 2011, Bandžović 2012a, Bandžović 2012b, Bandžović 2013, Bandžović 2016). Although primarily of a humanitarian nature, this question has its national-political aspect, as settling the refugees has become another source of tension between the Serbs and Muslims (Duranović 2013). As of November 1912, the Bosnian Muslim expatriates began appealing for the return to their former homeland. The Land Government in Sarajevo took over this task and even allocated money to finance the return, but only for the former Bosnians (excluding Ottoman Muslims). Due to health and sanitary reasons, the Government conditioned the return by the use of naval lines via Trieste. In early February 1913 the Joint Finance Ministry decided to cut funds for financing the return, and in the following month agreed with the Land Government to suspend the mass return at the state expenses. Lack of funds, Ottoman agitations to settle in Anatolia instead of returning to Bosnia, as well as possible Austro-Hungarian calculations regarding the resettlement have caused the return to be limited to merely 6.000 individuals, far less than the estimates of the Government and Muslim politicians on how many people would like to return. Nevertheless, the settlement of these returnees proved to be challenging. Leaving the humanitarian and social reasons aside, the return of the expatriates happened to be a chance for Muslim politicians to strengthen the share of Muslims in the total population, and a base for military volunteers for the Government in case of an ever-closer war, but also as an obstacle to allocation of land to foreign colonists. The Governor feared that the settlement of larger masses of Muslim refugees could harm the Government's actions on establishing the Serb-included Diet majority, as well as it could have increased the urban proletariat that would eventually raise social tensions. Orthodox and Catholic majority municipalities were particularly against the settling of returnees, and even some Muslim areas as well, as the returnees have somewhere been regarded as disloyal and unreliable elements. Eventually, the Land Government spent a little bit less than one million Crowns for the needs of transport and an additional almost a million Crowns for loans for houses, livestock, and agricultural tools (Kraljačić 1990).

The whole situation during the crisis has raised the question of security in the province. This, together with the proximity of Bosnia to Serbia and Montenegro, as well as past experiences, led the authorities to take extraordinary measures. Due to the wars, the high authorities of the Monarchy prepared the extraordinary measures already in November 1912, sanctioned by the Emperor in January 1913, and finally imposed on the 1st of May that year. The society faced the Constitution suspended and movement, gatherings and judicial rights limited, and the press censored, among

other regulations (Kapidžić 1963; Duranović 2013). The authorities have put the hardest pressure on Serb and workers' organizations. The army has taken over the Workers' chamber, confiscated property worth a significant amount of money, and dissolved all workers' organizations and Social Democratic Party branches in the entire province (Madžar 1984). Although these measures have been in force only for ten days, they have left noticeable consequences. It appeared as if the population generally accepted the extraordinary measures as a sign of Monarchy's determination, although with a clear difference between the ethnic groups, as it seemed the Muslims accepted them as a preparation for the war against Serbia, the Serbs feared them, while Croats showed no signs of delight (Kapidžić 1963). Moreover, Bosnian politicians have lost their self-confidence as virtually everyone understood that rights and guarantees previously granted by the Constitution could be taken away in the same manner as they were given (Kapidžić 1963).

During the wars, Croatia-Slavonia has also faced extraordinary measures. The Diet was dissolved in February and the Constitution was suspended in early April 1912, introducing the state of emergency under the Commissariat (Despot 2013, Matković 2016). These measures, however, were imposed primarily because of the long-standing political situation in this kingdom, but partly because the crisis in the region was expected (Despot 2013). Nevertheless, lifting them was prolonged due to the wars. The Hungarian government was especially skeptical about lifting the state of emergency in the kingdom as it had reservations regarding the impacts of the wars (Kann, David 1984). The state of emergency has brought more than 200 processes of high treason, press censorship, and mobilization (Redžić 1987; Despot 2013). All of it has brought more open and harsh criticism towards the Monarchy's authorities and consequently more support for Yugoslav unification, as the general circumstances – the wars and the state of emergency – pushed the population towards homogenization (Despot 2013). The critics have accused the leading statesmen of showing “more concern and understanding for the autonomy of the half-wild Albanian tribes, who do not represent either a political or an ethnic whole, than respect[ing] the existing, legally protected constitutional autonomy of the ancient kingdom of Croatia” and for advocating “for Albanian state autonomy, showing more generosity toward the destructive Ottoman Empire, (...) than justice for its own people” (Matković 2016: 192). Regarding the Albanian question, similar expressions of criticism, although less aggressive, came from some Slovenians (Ivašković 2020), and even some high Monarchy officials, such as the Joint Finance Minister Leon Biliński (2004).

The state of emergency, lasting much longer than in Bosnia, hasn't passed unnoticed in Dalmatia as well. Although this kingdom was spared of such measures, its Diet had no meetings as a sign of solidarity with its northern neighbour. Political demonstrations were often, involving even the members of the Monarchy's officials in this constituent kingdom. The crisis has brought processes of high treason in Dalmatia too, mobilization, dismissal of officials, as well as dissolving some local councils. One Austrian magazine has written that the victories of Serbian guns turned Dalmatia into a land hostile towards Monarchy (Gulić 2013; Despot 2013).

The area of Vojvodina and Slovenian lands, primarily due to their geographical distance from the areas and states directly affected by the wars, has had no emergency measures. However, some measures have been imposed there as well. Slovenian press has faced intensified press censorship as of November 1912 (Prebilič, Torkar 2013). As Serbs in the area of Vojvodina showed a lot of sympathies with their southern neighbours, actively supporting its army, the government imposed certain punitive anti-Serbian measures, that in turn increased dissent (Kann, David 1984).

Dalmatian politician Josip Smodlaka has summarized the state of affairs in the South Slavic lands – although it could have been primarily applied only to modern-day Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia – in the following way:

“Absolutism in Croatia, military dictatorship in Bosnia, in Dalmatia, torturing of our soldiers, arresting and persecuting of innocent people, dissolving the municipalities, opening the magazines in post offices, dissolving the organizations, pre-emptive press censorship, prohibition of expressions, police tyranny and spy regime (...) are clear features of a current state of war in the south of the Monarchy (...)“, leading him to conclude that: ‘The Yugoslavs of this Monarchy, especially Dalmatians, shall never forget how they have been treated in this case.’ (Gulić 2013: 373)

Generally speaking, as some authors have already observed, as the war efforts of Balkan allies – especially Serbia and Montenegro – have been going more successful, joy and delight among Habsburg South Slavs have also been increasing, followed by anxiety of the governments, all of which got to the highest point during the Crisis of Scutari, particularly in Dalmatia and Bosnia (Duranović 2013; Kapidžić 1964; Gulić 2013).

3. ECONOMY

Economic consequences are a natural part of every war. As economic activities usually transcend political borders, even those areas unaffected by wars directly face the consequences, as war events break the established economic routes or cause side effects.

The Italo-Turkish War of 1911 has already created a crisis in the money supply on the European market, which has only got worse after the outbreak of the Balkan Wars. Austria-Hungary has been particularly affected in this sense, as the war area used to be a market for Austro-Hungarian economic activities. The termination of exports to the Balkan countries had to be replaced by a quick restructuring of the export trade, for which the Monarchy didn't have enough economic power. Additionally, when the war broke out, these countries imposed a moratorium on payments, so Austro-Hungarian merchants haven't been eager to do their business due to uncertainty (Despot 2013).

The Balkan Wars – although miles away – have caused the slowdown of industrialization in Slovenia, raising unemployment and misery, at least according to the Slovenian press, as well as causing increased money withdrawal from bank savings (Prebilič, Torkar 2013). In Croat lands, closer and more directly connected to the areas affected by the wars, a rise of bank capital has slowed down, just as the economy in general has been negatively influenced, since the Ottoman Empire, as well as the Croatian population, changed its customers' needs during the 1912-13 crisis (Suppan 1980).

However, as a predominantly agricultural land, modern-day Croatia has experienced fewer negative effects caused by the wars than industrially more developed parts of the Monarchy. As one Croatian magazine wrote, new entrepreneurships were virtually impossible in those circumstances, and everyone was satisfied with keeping their current state of fortunes. Employees had difficulties in keeping their enterprises going, and some of them reduced their production activities and working days to three or four a week. In some parts of Croatia, economic enterprises have stopped working at all. Explicitly harsh proved to be the measure of mobilization, as the mobilized have been usually the most productive members of families and society in general. Mobilization has left many households desperate and with serious difficulties to survive. Village households have been generally on the brink of existence. The Land government tried to solve the problems through construction projects, but it was far from being enough. Even the Croatian housewives have faced problems, as it was

the Bulgarians who traditionally managed the gardening, and many Bulgarians went to assist their native country when the wars began. On the other hand, as the wars generally cause harm to most of the population, they also offer earning opportunities to a few. Bookstores have started to sell maps, and some have got into writing and selling poems and marches for the victory of the Allies, as well as gramophone recordings. Trade over the border, mostly illegal, included the smuggling of ammunition, while some merchants found their fortune in selling the *opanci* (traditional peasant shoes) to the Serbian soldiers (Despot 2013).

To the south, in the Kingdom of Dalmatia, the wars have brought difficulties as well. Mobilization happened to be the most problematic of all measures. Dalmatian representatives in the *Reichsrat* have stated that no land in the Monarchy has faced such harsh economic and social consequences caused by the mobilization as was the case with Dalmatia. Except for the people, the mobilization here encompassed the horses and wagons as well. Dalmatian economy suffered just as that of the rest of the Monarchy. Its most developed industry branch, cement production, in November 1912 exported only 2100 metric cents. For comparison, one year earlier, the export amounted to 5750 metric cents (Despot 2013).

The economy of Bosnia has been harmed by the wars as well. Although the least or one of the least developed parts of the Monarchy, Bosnia stood quite well compared to its Balkan neighbours in economic terms before the wars. On the eve of the wars, for example, the net product of heavy industry in Bosnia was significantly higher than those of Bulgaria and Serbia combined (Palare 2010). However, the wars have caused negative indicators in many fields. First and foremost, they have increased unemployment and fluctuation in the workforce, especially in smaller communities (Hadžibegović 1980). In the industrial field, they have specifically harmed the chemical industry.

Summarizing the impact of the Balkan Wars on Bosnia's economy, Peter Sugar stated that "[t]he Balkan Wars pushed economic issues into the background and the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina had to concentrate on the military measures which the Ministry of War demanded" and that "[t]he final years of Bilinski's administration and, in general, the years of the first World War, saw a decline in the industrial activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Foreseeing the invasion of the Serbian army, the government ordered the banks to ship their cash holdings to Austria-Hungary, and removed the capital and much of the machinery of enterprises owned by it. The privately-owned factories either followed this example or were taken over by the military with disastrous results" (Sugar 1963: 66-67).

On the positive side in some way, the wars and their side effects pushed the administration in Bosnia to accept more Bosnians as workers in the railways (Hadžibegović 1980). However, the wars have caused the most turbulence in the socio-economic field. As a land characterized by the remnants of serfdom, the agrarian question remained dominant even during the 1912/13 crisis. As it has been stated earlier, rumours of the arrival of the Serbian army emboldened the Serbs and frightened the Muslims. It also had significant political effects, as the Monarchy's authorities in Bosnia could no longer delay resolving the agrarian question in favour of the peasants (Juzbašić 2002; Bilinski 2004).

New political realities have brought the idea of an obligatory emancipation of the tenants to the table again. The Serbs have got a strong argument in favour of it, and even the Monarchy officials began considering it as a better option than the existing voluntary emancipation. Both the Governor and the Joint Finance Minister stood for, although with different approaches. The very aim of their new approach has been a neutralization of Serbia's influence on the peasants (Juzbašić 2002; Duranović 2013).

In November 1913, the Governor of Bosnia, Oskar Potiorek, privately informed the Croat and Muslim members of the Diet Presidency (Nikola Mandić and Safvet-bey Bašagić respectively) of the necessity of amending the Law on emancipation of the tenants – particularly because of the experience from the wars. He warned them that the question would be radically resolved on the Ottoman territories lost in the wars, implying that the Monarchy could not lag behind them (Juzbašić 2002).

The Balkan Wars therefore initiated a change in the 1911 *Law of Emancipation of the Tenants*. The Serb political circles offered two proposals, both of which would eventually lead to obligatory emancipation. However, one was more moderate and gradual, and the other one was more imminent and radical. Pressured by the Governor, the Muslim Diet representatives accepted the former (proposal of Danilo Dimović), projected to become a new law. However, it has never become a law as the Diet was initially suspended and eventually dissolved with the outbreak of the First World War (Imamović 2007) never to be reconvened again.

As the new law never became a reality, we cannot speculate to what degree it would have affected the process of emancipation. Ever since the beginning of the Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the process of gradual emancipation of the tenants has been ongoing, based on an agreement between a landlord and a tenant. A few hundred tenant lands were bought annually with the tendency of growth. The years 1912 and 1913 were the peak of this process, as more than five thousand tenant lands were bought each year. It's questionable, however, if this was the direct consequence of the Balkan Wars,

as the number of tenant lands bought from the landlords was in constant growth since 1908, or with just one exception even since 1903 (Kamberović 2005). Therefore, the correlation between the peak of the emancipation process and the wars is obvious, but we must keep in mind that a correlation does not necessarily and always mean causation. Whether this was a causation has not yet been deeply studied and definitely proved. Additionally, as Đorđe Krstić has noted, Serb peasants in some parts of Bosnia, particularly Krajina, have rejected any kind of land buying, as they believed in the arrival of Serbia and resolving their social status and obligations towards their landlords for free (Šabotić 2019). We know that the 1911 *Law of Emancipation* accelerated the land purchase, but whether the Balkan Wars themselves had a decisive impact on the pace of emancipation of the serfs is a question that requires further research.

CONCLUSION

The Balkan Wars were a major turning point in the history of the Balkans and Austria-Hungary in general. They irreversibly changed the political reality in the region, causing social turbulences even in the lands not directly affected by military activities. The Monarchy's Balkan policy hit a wall and in the upcoming years proved to be a complete failure. Military victories of Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria – as Slavic nations – overwhelmed the Slavs inside the Monarchy, pushing some among them to call more openly for the Yugoslav unit of the Monarchy, and a few others to call for a complete dissolution of the Monarchy and unification with Serbia and Montenegro. The question of the status of South Slavs in the Monarchy became the central problem of their authorities, as they realized how troublesome it might become if they kept ignoring the people's wishes and interests.

While the public debate on the future of South Slavs in the Monarchy was alive and in fact reached its peak during the wars, the political life in her South was suppressed. As a response to the outburst of Yugoslav nationalism and solidarity with Serbia and Montenegro, the authorities have chosen to impose extraordinary measures in most of the Monarchy's Slavic south or at least strengthen the censorship in the best case. Some magazines were banned, organizations dissolved and suspended, and the property of some of them seized. While the wars brought about closer cooperation between Serbs and Croats in Croat lands, they caused tensions between Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia, bringing it to the edge of open conflict. General mistrust between the people and the government was increased due to the wars, leaving dangerous social settings for the upcoming First World War.

The wars had consequences in the economic sphere, as usual. In industrially more developed parts of the Monarchy, these were higher, as the wars have, firstly, broken the flow of money, and secondly, as they generally occurred in what was the Austro-Hungarian trade area. However, even the less developed parts, such as Coat lands and Bosnia, have suffered significantly. Economic activities decreased, while some industry branches were particularly affected. The wars have also created new circumstances for the main issue in Bosnia – the agrarian one, enabling different approaches both from the position of the government and national-political elites.

It should be mentioned, however, that the consequences of the Balkan Wars alone cannot be separated from the general developments. In some aspects, the wars haven't created new occurrences, but rather intensified them bringing them to their peak. Settings for social turbulences in the Monarchy's south have already been set, and some of them just needed a spark to ignite them. The Balkan Wars appeared to be that spark. Additionally, a new, much greater war followed just a year later, making it – as Igor Despot has noticed – challenging to differentiate what was caused by the Balkan Wars, and what by other factors, further complicating properly addressing the question of the real impacts of the Balkan Wars.

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UTICAJ BALKANSKIH RATOVA (1912/13) NA DRUŠTVA U JUŽNOSLAVENSKIM ZEMLJAMA AUSTRO-UGARSKE

Sažetak:

U radu se govori o neposrednim posljedicama koje su Balkanski ratovi (1912-1913) ostavili na društva u južnoslavenskim zemljama Austro-Ugarske. On predstavlja pokušaj sumiranja dosadašnjih rezultata istraživanja različitih pitanja vezanih za posljedice Balkanskih ratova u ovim zemljama pojedinačno. Težište je bilo na pronalaženju zajedničkih karakteristika, kao i posebnosti u pogledu uticaja ratova na društva na slavenskom jugu Monarhije. U tom smislu u fokusu pažnje bili su nacionalno pitanje, politička scena, način upravljanja i privreda. Primjećuje se da su Balkanski ratovi predstavljali varnicu koja je rasplamsala plamen nacionalizma na jugu Monarhije, u okviru tadašnjeg jugoslavenskog pitanja. Nagovještavajući novo doba, ovi ratovi su jednim bili pokazatelj neizbježnosti reforme Monarhije u pravcu koji bi osiguravao povoljniji položaj za njene Jugoslavene, a drugima čak i naznaka njenog skorijeg kraja i jugoslavenskog ujedinjenja na širim osnovama. Istovremeno, ratovi su izazvali nove ili produbili postojeće krize u zemljama na jugu Monarhije, posluživši njenim vlastima kao izgovor za uvođenje vanrednih mjera ili pooštavanje postojećih restrikcija. Dok se u većini južnoslavenskih zemalja Austro-Ugarske vlast suočavala sa udruženim frontom onih snaga koje su otvoreno iskazivale podršku balkanskim saveznicama, to je u Bosni uveliko koristila sve veći politički razdor između dvije dominantne nacionalne zajednice i njenih političkih predstavnika. Ratovi su u svim zemljama ostavili negativne ekonomske posljedice, a stvarajući nove okolnosti u Bosni su omogućili drugačiji pristup rješavanju agrarnog pitanja.

Ključne riječi: Balkanski ratovi; habsburški Slaveni; Južni Slaveni; Austro-Ugarska

Author's address

Adresa autora

Amir Krpić

Univerzitet u Tuzli

Filozofski fakultet

krpic.amir@gmail.com