Communicating Values in a Complex Society: A Frame Analysis of Addresses of Political Leaders in the Campaign for 2018 General Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Political identity reflects one’s values. The overall rhetoric of a political actor aims at depicting a world view that resonates with her/his voters. This paper focuses on the campaign for the 2018 General Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given its political structure with two entities, 14 parliaments, and a three-member presidency to mention a few of the complexities, Bosnia and Herzegovina greatly struggles with functionality. In an environment with three ethnic groups and their respective representatives, communicating group-specific values is paramount objective for politicians. This paper analyses speeches delivered at pre-election gatherings of political parties on the level of the entity of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The aim is to analyze direct addresses to voters and subsequently shed light onto political messaging. Lakoff’s concept of frames will be utilized to get in-depth insight into the values, messages, and ideas political leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina share with the public.

Keywords: political communication; framing; Bosnia and Herzegovina; elections; values
1. INTRODUCTION

The Dayton peace agreement otherwise known as the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) is a unique framework of governing. The agreement that meant an end to war in 1995 also marked the beginning of a highly complex political system. The country now consists of two entities – the Bosniak and Croat majority Federation of B&H and the Serbian majority Republic of Srpska – both of which have their respective presidents/PMs, with the state as such having a three-member Presidency. There is also the Brčko District, a tiny territory in the northeast of the country. There are almost 260 ministers and 700 lawmakers on all levels. The Federation of B&H is further divided into ten cantons/counties all respectively and exclusively governing vital aspects of society e.g. the education sector. With only the outlines presented, it is not far-fetched to say that the political system of B&H is a rather complex one.

With a constantly unstable political climate, and the second-highest unemployment rate in the world according to Trading Economics (35.86%)\(^1\), it seems rather obvious that change is needed. However, to functionally obtain change, for all major state-level decisions a three-party consensus is required.\(^2\) Reading between the lines, the nationality-centered system installed in B&H has little space to offer for moving towards a “citizen-centric” state that few political parties stand for. In other words, the entire dispute is whether to see ethnic groups or individuals in a people.

2. THE INNER WORKINGS – A COGNITIVE-LINGUISTICS PERSPECTIVE

Cognitive linguist George Lakoff, one of the pioneers in the field, thoroughly defined political language from a cognitive viewpoint in two of his books Thinking Points – Communicating Our American Values and Vision (2006), and The Political Mind – A Cognitive Scientist’s Guide to Your Brain and Its Politics (2009).\(^3\) The entirety of the framework is based on frames.

People use frames – deep-seated mental structures about how the world works – to understand facts. Frames are in our brains and define our common sense. It is im-

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\(^1\) https://tradingeconomics.com/bosnia-and-herzegovina/indicators

\(^2\) With the possibility of a veto in form of so-called Vital National Interest that the House of Peoples, an ethnically exclusive body (of which there are three), can deem a policy „destructive“ by a majority of votes. https://www.parlament.ba/Content/Read/39?title=Vitalninacionalniinteres&lang=en

\(^3\) For more on this topic see Charteris-Black (2005) and Lakoff’s Moral Politics – How Liberals and Conservatives Think (2002).
possible to think or communicate without activating frames, is an which frame is activated is of crucial importance. (Lakoff 2006: 10)

To rephrase Lakoff’s words in simple terms, frames are reference points for what counts for an individual as common sense. They are non-linguistics features that are pervasive in reasoning and speaking. On the surface of it, words are representative of frames i.e. each word belongs to a frame.

“Framing is about getting language that fits your worldview. It is not just language. The ideas are primary – and the language carries those ideas, evokes those ideas” (Lakoff 2004: 4). Words that resonate with the audience are the once that make sense, that get the desired attention (Lakoff 2006). In practical terms, words do not mean anything if they are not based on a presupposing notion of the truth that is in the words. In practical terms, it does not make sense to talk about e.g. founding fathers of B&H (as in the US), even though the phrase is conceivable and linguistically acceptable. There is no value for it. Entire societies function on the principle of frames. The contemporary Bosnian society, for example, has inherited the system of healthcare that was established in former Yugoslavia. The unemployed are registered and have basic healthcare for free. In other words, it has become part of the reasoning process about healthcare that it is essentially for free. The mere mention of healthcare or anything related triggers the whole system and reasoning is paralleled with presupposition mentioned. If it is according to the frame, it makes sense. Conversely, superannuation in B&H is a privilege, the reason for it being the practice of undeclared labor. It has become an open secret that many employers in the private sector do not commit themselves to paying taxes and pension funds for their workers. This is an example of the way of reasoning about a certain social issue. Everything Bosnians know about the labor, pension and healthcare funds is in the frame. All of this is taken as presupposing notions while speaking about the matters at hand.

Language gets its power because it is defined relative to frames, prototypes, metaphors, narratives, images, and emotions. Part of its power comes from its unconscious aspects: we are not consciously aware of all that it evokes in us, but it is there, hidden, always at work. If we hear the same language over and over, we will think more and more in terms of the frames and metaphors activated by that language. And it doesn’t matter if you are negating words or questioning them, the same frames and metaphors will be activated and hence strengthened. (Lakoff 2009: 15)

During random controls in the period from November 2015 through 2017, the Tax Department of Federation of B&H found 35% of unregistered workers and 3,698 stores that do not give receipts for their goods or services. (http://www.pufbih.ba/v1/novosti/1088/izvjetaj-o-naplati-javnih-prihoda-i-najznaajnijim-aktivnostima-pore-zne-uprave-federacije-bih-u-2017-godini)
Frames work for every word because words are parts of them along with the scenarios that have been learned over time. For example, upon hearing that a robbery happened, the typical scenario of the robber(s) will be triggered: one or more young or middle-aged men, perhaps using tools, and covered up. This does not mean that elderly ladies cannot perform a robbery, but it is just not usual i.e. not a part of our robbery frame. Frames have their features as cited in Lakoff (2006: 26-27):

- They are largely unconscious
- They define what is common sense to us
- Repetition reinforces frames
- Surface frames activate deep frames (and inhibit opposing ones)
- Deep frames do not change easily
- The brain permits different/inconsistent moral worldviews
- Facts alone do not make a difference
- Negating a frame only reinforces it.

All of the features mentioned play a role in understanding and devising language that fits one’s worldview.

The present study was conducted on instances of online (Croft and Cruse 2004) language usage, that is, spoken language addressed to an audience. Despite the possibility that the speeches may have been previously prepared and written/read off a sheet of paper, the fact that they were delivered via spoken language makes them an instance of online language usage.

### 2.1. Surface frames, deep frames, and issue-defining frames

Surface frames are the linguistic representation of deep frames. They are lexical frames – the conceptual frames associated with words like “war” in its ordinary sense and “terror” in its ordinary sense (Lakoff 2006: 22). From the example of lexical surface frame (Lakoff ibid.) comes the planetary known “war on terror” phrase. “Background knowledge affects utterance meaning precisely because utterances are designed to evoke information from memory in a way that supports action and interaction in the physical and social world” (Coulson 2001: 17). Hearing a word automatically triggers the listener’s background knowledge and the belonging frame. However, appealing surface wording does not suffice for systemic messaging. Words that evoke features of deep frames are the ones that do make their way to the listeners.
Deep frames represent one’s moral worldview and what counts as common sense. For deep frames to work effectively, they need to be based on real values that have previously been instantiated by modes of thought and/or behavior (Lakoff 2006). Traditional marriage, religious rites, or family, for example, are deeply rooted frames with underlying scenarios. In Bosnian terms, the deep frame of what it means to be a Bosnian has changed completely, if not vanished altogether. Politically speaking, Bosnians “do not exist”, but only Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs as three “constitutive peoples”. In the 2013 census, numerous individuals did insist on calling themselves “Bosnians and Herzegovinians”, however, constitutionally speaking, they do not get a share in governance. In other words, “Bosnian/Herzegovinian” as a deep frame is highly questionable, demanding definition.

“Just as frames structure and define social institutions, they also define issues. An issue-defining frame characterizes the problem, assigns blame, and constrains the possible solutions. More importantly, issue-defining frames block relevant concerns if those concerns are outside of the frame” (Lakoff 2006: 19). Issue-defining frames are between the more abstract deep frame and the concrete surface frames. A Bosnian example of issue-defining frame is how certain people call the 1990s war as opposed to others. Some call it an “aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina”5, others call it a “civil war” (Kasapović 2015), whereas the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) sentenced several individuals for “joint criminal enterprise”, yet several others call it “genocide”6. All of the wording is issue-defining i.e. characterizing the problem, assigning blame, and constraining solution. The “aggression” frame is from within the country i.e. the victims’ framing of reality, assigning blame to attackers from outside in which case resistance is the only solution. The “civil war” frame characterizes the problem in terms of an in-country battle with no outside factor, while it is sharing blame amongst the people(s) in the country and constrains possible solution to stopping the civil war and working on what is left. The “joint criminal enterprise” frame shapes the issue without presupposing nationalistic agendas. A criminal is any civilian who does crime, the fact that it is a “joint enterprise” makes it only a group of criminals, nothing more. That is, blame is assigned to individuals, not nations or peoples7, with presupposing criminal intentions only. This

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7 However, nations are frequently identified with/through their leader, and that is, on the other hand, being used for rhetorical purposes. The NATION IS A PERSON conceptual metaphor illustrates exactly that. Lakoff (2004) gives the example of the Iraq war the US fought in which they actually proclaimed to be fighting Saddam Hus-
way of framing constrains shares blame to several individuals and puts an end to itself (the frame) by prosecuting the ones responsible. The “genocide” frame, on the other hand, is wider-scale. It aims at framing the actions of the individuals engaged as violations against human biological existence and for extremist ideological reasons. Hence, blame is assigned rigorously, as well as solutions, that is, individuals who were in leading positions need to be punished harshly.

Naming phenomena matters because it provides a stand on the truth behind and triggers action. Geary (2011: 68-69) cites a research in which respondents were asked to put into words their associations to the phenomenon called “greenhouse gases”. The research yielded in explanations like “nice places where plants live”. This shows an instance of “mis-framing”. The associations of “green” and “house” are positive which resulted in a failure of the frame as to assign blame and offer/constrain possible solution. The research institute Cultural Logic eventually proposed a more vivid, more truth-depicting frame in calling the phenomenon “carbon dioxide blanket”, triggering far worse associations. Another, more contemporary Bosnian example of how mis-framing does not depict the truth is “massive migrations” from B&H to EU countries. It is usually young people in search for better life conditions. This trend has been consistently called the problem of the “departing youth”, both by the media and political actors. However, this kind of framing falls short of the truth. It does describe what is going on, but it does not call out the responsible or offer a solution. It is an example of surface framing only. An alternative issue-framing for the problem could be incapable authorities of keeping the youth in the country, thus directly calling on politicians to either change their policies or themselves being removed from office.

Frames shape reality. The absence of proper framing means absence of proper action. Deeply rooted social issues, if not given in an issue-defining frame, fail to be addressed accordingly (Lakoff 2006).

8 Ratko Mladić, former Commander of the Main Staff of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) of genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war. These crimes were committed by Serb forces during the armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) from 1992 until 1995. Ratko Mladić was sentenced to life imprisonment. (http://www.icty.org/en/press/icty-convicts-ratko-mladi%C4%87-for-genocide-war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity)
3. THE 2018 B&H ELECTIONS – A BATTLE BETWEEN SINGULARITY AND PLURALITY

The research conducted for this paper included all accessible campaign speeches on official webpages of the following parties: 

- SDA – Stranka demokratske akcije (Party of Democratic Movement), 
- SBB – Savez za bolju budućnost (Alliance for Better Future), 
- HDZ – Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union), 
- SDP – Socijaldemokratska partija (Social Democratic Party), 
- DF – Demokratski front (Democratic Front), 
- NS – Naša stranka (Our Party).

The first three parties mentioned are representatives of the ethnicity-centered model i.e. national parties, while SDP and the two relatively new parties – DF and Naša stranka – share a citizen-oriented idea of state. These six parties have a majority of seats in the Parliament of the Federation of B&H.\(^9\)

The main criterion for distinction between the two groups of parties is the concept of state they stand for respectively. SDA and HDZ as traditional, still leading nationalist Bosniak and Croat parties respectively, support the ethnic-group centered state model. SBB, by its Statute, is a party of the political center without ethnic or national prefixes. However, functionally speaking, it represents a Bosniak party. SDP is the leading left-wing, pro-citizen\(^11\) organization. DF is a social democratic party while NS define themselves as social liberal organization. What follows from this is that the perception of the state and its citizens is the principle distinctive factor. That is, there are supporters of the (ethnic) group concept on one side, and the ones that support the (citizen) individual concept on the other. This is visible from the messages they send throughout the campaign.

3.1. Values

People do not necessarily vote in their self-interest. They vote their identity. They vote their values. They vote for who they identify with. They may identify with their self-interest. That can happen. It is not that people never care about their self-interest. But they vote their identity. And if their identity fits their self-interest, they will vote for that. It is important to understand this point. It is a serious mistake to assume that people are simply always voting in their self-interest. (Lakoff 2004: 19)\(^9\)

\(^9\) SDA – 14 campagne sites, SBB – 16 campagne sites, DF – 4 campagne sites, NS – 5 campagne sites, HDZ – 9 campagne sites, SDP – 2 campagne sites. Speeches from all representatives/speakers at each campagne site were taken into consideration. Links to pages found in references.

\(^10\) http://www.izbori.ba/rezultati_izbora?resId=25&langId=1#/4/0/0/0/0

Values are instantiated by frames and put into words. Political language highly depends on this fact. Lakoff (2004, 2006) has framed the two-party system of the US in terms of two models: The Strict Father Model portrayed by the Republican Party and The Nurturant Parent Model portrayed by the Democratic Party. Both models presuppose a list of concepts which American politics is based on. Constitution-wise, B&H has three narratives: the Bosniak, the Croat, and the Serb. Those are three (competing) worldviews that stem from ethnic membership, however, with vague definitions, both theoretically and practically. For instance, every citizen of B&H can for themselves decide what to be (any of the three “options”) and hence belong to one or the other two ethnicities. \(^{12}\) This leaves the theoretical definition of an ethnic group on shaky grounds. In other words, it does not have to be ideological. The real dispute, however, is what is called “legitimate representation” in Bosnian politics. It is due to this issue that this study refers to the Federation of B&H only because both Bosniaks and Croats can choose among either representatives. That means that, say, a Croat can vote for a Bosniak, or vice-versa. As a matter of fact, the label “illegitimate representative” is pulled out only when that is the case, the present case being that Croat representative and leader of HDZ, Dragan Čović, lost to DF’s Željko Komšić for the Croat representative in the B&H Presidency, however, both of them are declared Croats. Now in his third office, Komšić is subject to harsh criticism over “legitimate representation”. The Komšić-dispute has serious repercussions. So far, he has been proclaimed persona non-grata in seventeen Croat-majority towns/cities in the country over charges of “illegitimate representation”, followed by debates about changing the election law as to allow intra-ethnic votes only.

If Croat majority did vote for Čović and the majority of Bosniak votes went to Komšić\(^{13}\), what does the issue-defining frame “illegitimate representation” stand for? Is it that, following Lakoff’s quote from above, Bosniaks voted their values acted out by a Croat, and if so, is it against their self-interest? The issue-defining frame at hand characterizes the problem of illegitimate representation, assigns blame mainly to the Election law (partly to the person elected) and constrains possible solution in terms of the only solution being a substantial change of the Election law.

Lakoff (2009) introduced the concept of “biconceptualism” at the center of which stands the premise that a majority of voters (and citizens in general) are not only Re-

\(^{12}\) At the time of writing this article, there is an ongoing debate about the Minister of health of the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton with allegations that he changed ethnicity to acquire a seat that is meant for a member of the other ethnic group.

\(^{13}\) With 225.500 votes Komšić won more than Bosniak Presidency member Đaferović with 212.581. (http://www.izbori.ba/rezultati_izbora?resId=25&langId=1#/1/1/0/0/701)
publican or only Democrats in terms of American politics. Lakoff considers worldviews issue-depending, meaning that everybody’s value system permits mutually inhibitory worldviews in nonoverlapping areas of life (Lakoff 2009: 70). He offers the Saturday-night and the Sunday-morning scenarios in which one individual can exhibit their liberal nature in a club on a Saturday night and go to Church the next morning. Those are opposing worldviews but very probable ones as well. Likewise, Bosnian voters (on each side) can be considered biconceptual, since they allow their values to sway between representatives of different ethnic groups. The fact that Bosniaks, with a vast majority, elected Komšić as the (Croat) member of Presidency shows the voters’ biconceptualism. The concept of biconceptualism, on the face of it, can appear to be hypocrisy. Lakoff (2009: 71-72) defines the issue in terms of a value-consistency frame, in which values are supposed to be consistent and all-encompassing, the same ones used in all cases. Value consistency means “integrity”, while a lack of consistency should then be considered “hypocrisy”. Area by area, there can be consistency of values. It is only across issue areas that an inconsistency can legitimately arise (without the individual being called a hypocrite). In other words, a voter may be liberal on education but conservative on family issues. With the Komšić-issue there is consistency on the side of voters i.e. the 200,000 plus voters showed only shared patriotic values with a non-Bosniak representative, and not hypocrisy.

The goal of the following section is to provide a frame-based analysis of values political representative share with their audience.

3.2. In their own words – framing complex values

The 2018 General Elections in B&H were marked by explicit ad hominem rhetoric and a high level of “anti-other” statements. That is to say, a considerable amount of speeches intended to frame their opponents in a negative way rather than presenting their respective programs for the future. However, surface ad hominem framing is not essential to this paper since it does not necessarily shed light onto the deep value frames.14

What it means to be a Bosniak was at the center of the debate between the two biggest Bosniak parties, SDA and SBB, however, the arguments exchanged only managed to demean the other and blame for not being a good enough Bosniak. SDA’s Džaferović as the only representative explicitly defines Bosniaks by saying: “We are

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14 Surface framing can, however, yield in a rooted frame eventually. That is why repetition is the key to framing social issues (Lakoff 2006).
a moderate and good European people. We are Muslims, Bosniaks, Bosnians, and Europeans.” A close examination of SDA’s and SBB’s debate about the Bosniak frame reveals that both blame the other for betrayal and division. “Don’t vote for those who blamed Bosniaks and Alija Izetbegović for starting the war only to protect some fishy guys they worked with. Punish them on the elections and let them know that they cannot lead Bosniaks,” said Džaferović.15 “Radončić is master of lies,” said Izetbegović.16 “Remember that, when on the 7th of October, Mr. Izetbegović and his SDA leave, democracy will return to this country […] Each government that oppressed the people, collapsed completely […] They think they are going to scare the people,” said Radončić.17 At the core of it all there is supposed to be faithfulness to “Bosniakhood”. Besides Džaferović’s quote from above, however, there is no clear vision of what it means to be a Bosniak. Both parties make reference to the first President of the Presidency of B&H, late Alija Izetbegović18, both with due respect, however, only to blame the other party of not being faithful to late Izetbegović’s legacy. “The great Alija Izetbegović said, ‘By Great God we swear that we won’t be slaves,’ and I tell you: By Great God we swear that we won’t be slaves of Bakir and Sebija19,” said Radončić.20 “Watch him how he gradually undermines the memory of Alija Izetbegović,” said Izetbegović.21 There is no single “Bosniak messaging” besides the aforementioned. What can be deduced from the analysis is that Bosniak political actors do not foster any sort of assumed “Bosniakhood”. Framing the other as non-Bosniak does simply not suffice for deep frame building.

Judging by political messaging in the 2018 elections, Croat political actors are far more aware of framing their values. Croat representatives make it infallibly prominent what it means to be a Croat. The most deeply rooted is the unity frame – Croats are “a huge family”, who need “legitimate representations”, who “defend the honor of their fatherland”, who have “faith in God”, who want to reclaim “constitutional equality”, who take as guiding star the “century-long sacrifice of their people and the re-

18 Father of Bakir Izetbegović, SDA leader.
19 Wife of Bakir Izetbegović.
ligion, family, language, and culture”, who will not allow the intentions of others to make Croats “a minority”, who “defend their ground”, who “speak Croatian”. All of the above quotations (in translation) have a unifying sentiment portraying “united fight” for the position of the Croat people. That, moreover, implies that there is an opposing side, however, Croat political actors as if being particularly aware of framing. Namely, in his book *Don’t Think of an Elephant* (2004), Lakoff states that even negating someone’s words actually promotes and fosters the opponent’s frame. HDZ representatives did not mention, let alone demean, representatives of other ethnicities (or other non-HDZ Croats) in a single instance. They performed consistent framing of “Croathood” taking the lead in doing so. It ought to be said that HDZ as the leading Croat party also has dominance over a unified list of thirteen Croat parties (HNS – Hrvatski narodni sabor, Croatian National Assembly) with Čović being the president. In other words, Croat parties show by example what can be discerned as their main framing agenda – unifying.

Unity under one ethnicity is a principle that the second group of parties consistently reject. The opposing parties struggle with redefining the country in terms of its citizens rather than ethnicities. SDP as the oldest of the non-ethnicity-focused parties declares themselves in its Statute as legitimate heritors of several communist parties. SDP\(^{22}\) and DF\(^{23}\) both stand for a citizen-oriented state model; however, their rhetoric is offensive and focusing on their opponents rather than fostering that concept as a deep frame. The fact that both parties stand for a new state model is not visible in their framing. On the other hand, Naša Stranka does exactly that, framing a citizen state model. NP’s political actors speak of “social sensitivity”, “elimination of poverty”, “human and political integrity”, “morals and principles”, “the faith of the country being in our hands”, “unity”, “forgiveness”, “regaining dignity to the institution of the Presidency”, “real politics based on values”, “a multi-ethnic citizen state for all peoples and citizens”, “no time to postpone”, and “EU norms”. Particularly interesting is the framing of the current problem of the population drain. They refer to the social issue as a huge problem of “*our children* leaving”, evoking an emotional stand on the fact and implicitly directing criticism to the ones responsible. Another interesting framing is “brotherhood in difference” which also stems from the family metaphor but leaves space for difference.

\(^{22}\) SDP did poorly on posting their speeches on the official webpage.

\(^{23}\) The party was formed by Željko Komšić, a former high-ranked SDP member.
4. CONCLUSION

Facts alone do not suffice as for portraying the truth and even less for persuading others of it. When there is a lack of proper naming i.e. framing, there is a lack of proper action. Surface name-giving to phenomena, instantiated by slogans for example, if not tied to deep frames, does not yield in success. If the deep frame for the message is missing or is unclear, the online understanding may be given, but further use of it will certainly not be made. The present paper was an attempt to see through basic worldviews of political parties and their actors, and to provide an explanation to it. From what was put forward in the paper, the main distinctive factor is the concept of the state and its citizens. There are two opposing views – the Ethnicity Frame and the Citizens Frame – seen as a battle between (and for) the Group concept and the Individual concept of state. Nationalist parties stand for the ethnicity-based state model, fostering the respective ethnic frames. However, as can be seen from the analysis, with Bosniak parties there is a discrepancy between intention and output. That is, Bosniak representatives focused on what it means not to be a Bosniak rather than supporting positive attitudes of the frame. On the other hand, Croat political actors, it is claimed, rather successfully foster the deep Croat frame, even holding the lead position in doing so (not permitting others to frame what is inherently theirs). Parties that support the citizen concept of state were also split in two groups. Even all of them in their statutes do support the idea of equal rights for every single citizen, only NS managed to frame it in a way that does justice to their basic political views.

The highly debated issue of “illegitimate representation” was defined as an instance of biconceptualism on one part of the voters. Several other kinds of framing of intense social issues were also provided an explanation for. What can conclusively be said is that only one part of the political actors seems to be aware of the presence and importance of framing. It was also implied that the intermediate level of framing – issue-defining frames – is the “battle ground” for political debate over social issues of high importance.
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   • www.hdzbih.org
   • www.sbb.ba
   • www.sdp.ba
   • www.fronta.ba
   • www.nasastranka.ba
KOMUNICIRANJE SISTEMA VRIJEDNOSTI U KOMPLEKSNOJ DRUŠTVU: ANALIZA FREJMOVA OBRAĆANJA POLITIČKIH LIDERI U TOKU KAMPANJE ZA OPĆE IZBORE 2018. U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI

Sažetak

Ključni pojmovi: politička komunikacija; frejming; Bosna i Hercegovina; izbori; vrijednosti

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