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Review paper

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DISCOURSE AND COMMUNICATION ANALYSIS OF THE MILOŠEVIĆ-TUĐMAN AGREEMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The Karadžorđevo meeting in March 1991 between Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman holds profound historical significance in the context of escalating tensions in the former Yugoslavia. This paper employs a communicology perspective to comprehensively analyze the agreement, unveiling intricate negotiation dynamics and implications for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Analyzing the Milošević-Tuđman Agreement through communicology reveals communication patterns, rhetorical strategies, and implicit messages. This framework clarifies how language shapes perceptions, influences decisions, and impacts political contexts. The analysis examines the Karadžorđevo meeting's context, outlining political developments and rising nationalism leading to the negotiations. Using primary sources, it considers various stakeholders' arguments about the agreement's existence and implications. Expert teams' roles in discussing Bosnia's partition and key individuals' statements are scrutinized. Findings shed light on implicit messages, power dynamics, and nationalistic discourses. Results highlight the agreement's immediate and long-term consequences on Bosnia and Herzegovina, including its role in the Bosnian War. Critiques, controversies, and alternative interpretations are addressed. In conclusion, this paper summarizes key findings, underscores contributions to scholarship, and suggests avenues for future research. Analyzing the Milošević-Tuđman Agreement through communicology deepens our understanding of complex negotiation dynamics during a critical period in Bosnia and Herzegovina's history.

Keywords: Milošević-Tuđman agreement; discourse analysis; communication analysis; Yugoslavia's dissolution; nationalism and tensions; Bosnian war

INTRODUCTION

History has long been regarded as a teacher of life, offering invaluable lessons that transcend time and shape the course of political processes. The significance of history in political realms cannot be overstated; it serves as a guiding force, offering insights into past events, policies, and societal structures that inform decision-making and shape future trajectories. The intrinsic link between history and politics is undeniable, as historical narratives often underpin political ideologies, policies, and identities. Nevertheless, historical knowledge is not an end in itself; it rather serves as a platform for comprehending complex sociopolitical dynamics. In doing so, it intertwines with diverse disciplines, placing it within real social currents and acquiring contemporary and comprehensive significance. One such, undoubtedly, is communicology, within which the significance of historical narratives in shaping political processes has gained considerable attention, especially in the last three decades.

Communication, encompassing language, discourse, and rhetoric, plays a pivotal role in how historical events are portrayed, interpreted, and utilized within political spheres. That is why the analysis of communication within historical contexts provides a deeper understanding of how language, statements, and narratives influence political decisions and public perceptions. The reason for this lies in language, which acts as a powerful tool in constructing historical narratives and shaping political discourse. The choice of words, rhetoric, and framing of events can significantly influence how history is remembered and interpreted. Political leaders often use language strategically to advance their agendas, manipulate public opinion, and legitimize their actions. Historical events are framed and communicated in ways that align with particular political ideologies or objectives. Furthermore, examining statements, speeches, and communications within historical contexts reveals the complexities of power dynamics, negotiations, and the interplay between different actors.

The meeting between Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman in Karadordevo in March 1991 holds significant historical importance in the context of the escalating tensions and conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. This paper aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the Milošević-Tuđman Agreement in Karadordevo, employing a communicology perspective to shed light on the complexities of the negotiations and the subsequent implications for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The field of communicology, rooted in the interdisciplinary study of communication, offers valuable insights into the dynamics of human interaction and the power of discourse. By applying a discourse and communication analysis to the Milošević-

-Tuđman Agreement, one can explore the underlying communication patterns, rhetorical strategies, and discursive practices employed by the key actors involved. This analysis seeks to uncover the deeper meanings and implications embedded within communicative acts, examining the explicit content and the implicit messages and power dynamics at play. It provides a framework for understanding how language, symbols, and gestures shape perceptions, influence decision-making processes, and impact social and political contexts.

In the context of the Karadžorđevo meeting, the given analysis offers a nuanced perspective on the motives and interpretations surrounding the negotiations. It helps us discern the underlying intentions, power struggles, and discursive tactics utilized by Milošević and Tuđman during their discussions. Furthermore, it enables one to identify the broader implications of their agreement on the subsequent political developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This paper will begin with a historical overview, providing the necessary background to understand the context in which the Karadžorđevo meeting took place. It will outline the political developments, the rise of nationalism, and tensions leading up to the negotiations. This historical backdrop sets the stage for a comprehensive analysis of the Milošević-Tuđman Agreement. The subsequent sections will delve into the specifics of the Karadžorđevo meeting, exploring the circumstances, motivations, and interpretations surrounding the event. Drawing upon primary sources and available records, one will examine the arguments put forth by various stakeholders regarding the existence and implications of the agreement. Additionally, the role of expert teams in discussing the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the statements made by key individuals involved will be explored. Utilising the tools of communicology analysis, one will scrutinise the communication patterns, rhetorical strategies, and discursive practices employed by Milošević and Tuđman during the negotiations. By dissecting their speeches and statements, the authors aim to uncover the implicit messages, power dynamics, and nationalistic discourses prevalent in their discourse.

The findings and interpretations derived from the communicology analysis will provide valuable insights into the immediate and long-term consequences of the Milošević-Tuđman Agreement. We will assess its impact on Bosnia and Herzegovina, examining how it influenced subsequent political developments and contributed to the Bosnian War. Finally, this paper will address the critiques and controversies surrounding the analysis, considering alternative interpretations and addressing ethical considerations. It will conclude by summarising the key findings, highlighting the contributions to scholarship, and providing recommendations for further research in

this field. By examining the Milošević-Tuđman Agreement in Karadžorđevo through the lens of communicology analysis, this paper aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics and communication strategies at play during this critical period in the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

BACKGROUND AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE KARADORĐEVO MEETING

When examining the commencement of the Yugoslavian disintegration, many perceive it to be June 28, 1989, Vidovdan, when numerous Serbs congregated at Gazimestan, near Kosovo's capital, Priština, in order to commemorate the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. In Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and wherever a substantial Serbian populace resided, there was a profound national fervour leading up to this tragic commemoration. It appeared as though a novel Serbian saint had emerged on that day. Esteemed officials from the federal state and representatives from other republics and provinces were present at the ceremony. The crowd eagerly awaited the oration of their newfound leader, Slobodan Milosevic, who, after instigating nationalist tensions, promptly transitioned to practical politics, uttering a perilous statement, declaring, "After six centuries, we are once again preoccupied with battles and disputes. These may not be armed battles, but the possibility is not excluded." The crowd responded with fervent applause, and discerning politicians and analysts realized that Milošević was engaging in sabre-rattling, openly threatening warfare, which was already being diligently prepared within his inner circles (Bilandžić 2006).

Milošević firmly believed that he could attain supremacy by manipulating Serbian national matters and securing control over the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. He also aspired to assume the presidency of the SFRY and the leadership of its armed forces, relying on the backing of the JNA leadership. His vision incorporated the notion of a "Greater Serbia" and sought political support from Serbian populations in various territories. Nonetheless, his plans encountered opposition in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to some extent in Macedonia, where nationalism was burgeoning and the yearning to resist Greater Serbian hegemony, particularly Milošević's tactics, was intensifying (Malcolm 1995).

Bosnia and Herzegovina found itself caught during these developments, with an underdeveloped economy. Nationalism was on the upswing, but the official country policy wasn't attuned to these trends. The stage was being set for Bosnia and Herze-

govina to be depicted as an artificial political entity, AVNOJ's decisions undermined, and the validity of the 1974 Constitution challenged, all portrayed as aimed at subverting the interests of the Serbian people and Yugoslav unity. This period laid the foundation for subsequent territorial ambitions and nationalist conflicts. Slobodan Milošević's strategic manipulation of the populist movement and mass enthusiasm through large anti-bureaucratic rallies led to the removal of political entities opposing his vision of a unified, centralized Serbia. The "yogurt revolution" was aimed at addressing Kosovo and Vojvodina, introducing a new Serbian constitution to centralize authority, and challenging the 1974 Constitution as anti-Serbian, confederal, and part of alleged anti-Serbian conspiracies under Kardelj and Tito.

At that time, few questioned the need for Yugoslavia, but the fundamental disputes and increasingly heated arguments, with a distinct national tone, revolved around the question of "What kind of Yugoslavia?" Some reiterated the importance of supporting only those proposals for constitutional changes that ensure its socialist perspective, brotherhood and unity, and which as a whole respect the full equality of peoples and nationalities (Ribičić and Tomac 1989). Milošević's propaganda, however, persistently and openly created a political climate and mood that demanded a reopening of the discussion on the fundamental principles of the Yugoslav community, AVNOJ commitments in the Constitution, and the nature of Yugoslavia, with varying regional stances. Slovenia embraced a nationalist program, Croatia affirmed "MASPOK" theses, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia leaned towards preserving AVNOJ Yugoslavia with 1974 Constitution amendments. Montenegro initially wavered but later aligned with Milošević. The dispute centred on AVNOJ continuity, challenging the existing constitutional federation based on AVNOJ principles and raising issues of historical legitimacy and the rights of nations.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro saw a resurgence of great-power and nationalist ideas, undermining their political interests and challenging the Republic's legitimacy. The tightly controlled Belgrade press fueled campaigns laden with lies, fabrications, and sensationalism. Serbia and Kosovo faced harsh purges, while Vojvodina experienced a collective overnight purge. To secure Yugoslavia, gaining the support of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and reforming its Central Committee and Presidency was crucial. The focus remained on preserving socialism as the unifying factor within Yugoslavia.

NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN MILOŠEVIĆ AND TUĐMAN

On March 25, 1991, the Croatian President Franjo Tuđman and the Serbian President Slobodan Milošević convened in Karađorđevo. The following day, March 26, 1991, the front page of the news was reported by the daily newspaper *Oslobođenje*, stating that ahead of the upcoming summit of the six republic presidents, in Karađorđevo situated in the border region between the two republics, the presidents of the Republic of Serbia and Croatia, Slobodan Milošević and Dr. Franjo Tuđman, held a meeting (*Oslobođenje* 1991a). During the prolonged dialogue, as officially communicated, addressing critical issues of the political and economic crisis, as well as the future relations within Yugoslavia, the primary content of the forthcoming presidential summit was deliberated upon.

Despite well-documented disparities in fundamental matters concerning the interests of the Republic of Serbia and Republic of Croatia, and by extension, the Serbian and Croatian peoples, given the pivotal significance of relations between Serbia and Croatia, and the Serbian and Croatian peoples, for the entirety of diplomatic interactions and even the resolution of the state-political impasse, the discourse was conducted with an aim to eliminate courses of action that jeopardize the interests of either the Serbian or Croatian populace as a whole. Persistent efforts were made to seek enduring resolutions, all while fully respecting historical national interests. The establishment of a timeframe, not exceeding two months, for addressing existing Yugoslavian quandaries was deliberated upon, with a shared intention to present this proposition collectively at the upcoming presidential convocation. Furthermore, amidst the deepening economic crisis, proposals and solutions were examined, including those outlined by the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce, pertaining to modifications in the operations and composition of the Federal Executive Council during the transitional period, to safeguard the nation against economic collapse (*Oslobođenje* 1991a).

On the same day, March 26, 1991, in a statement provided to the Associated Press (AP), the then-Vice President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), Stipe Mesić, commented on the aforementioned meeting, asserting that the Yugoslav republican leaders would reach an agreement regarding the nation's future no later than April 15, 1991. *Oslobođenje*, which conveyed Mesić's statement, reported that Mesić confirmed that following the "secret meeting" between the presidents of Serbia and Croatia, Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman, Prime Minister Ante Marković was under pressure (*Oslobođenje* 1991b).

During an interview with the Italian newspaper *Corriere della Sera* on December 15, 1997, Dr. Franjo Tuđman addressed inquiries regarding the nature of his dialogues with Milošević, spanning from their initial meeting in Karadžorđevo to the present moment. In response, Dr. Tuđman underscored the media's tendency to emphasize his encounter with Milošević in Karadžorđevo. Dr. Tuđman articulated that his purpose throughout these discussions was to prevent a violent conflict from erupting in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He sought a resolution that would secure the well-being of the populace, with particular attention to the Croatian minority, which held a precarious position in Bosnia and Herzegovina, susceptible to vulnerabilities from both Serbs and Muslims. Dr. Tuđman emphasized his persistent effort in proposing and pursuing solutions that would garner consensus across all three ethnic groups. When queried about the existence of an agreement concerning the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tuđman explicitly responds that there has never been any accord between him and Milošević, nor any discussions of Bosnia's division (Tuđman 1999). Interestingly, within Tuđman's transcripts, slightly over two months after the Karadžorđevo meeting, a clear intent to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina can be discerned. Hence, in a session of the Supreme State Council of Croatia on June 8, 1991, the "president of all Croats", during a discussion with close collaborators, accentuates the inherent unsustainability of Croatia's present borders, particularly in the context of defense. President Tuđman, from both a Croatian and Serbian perspective, acknowledges a problem and a necessity to address the essence of Bosnia and Herzegovina's conundrum, given that the post-World War II establishment of Bosnia and the delineation of its boundaries represent a historical absurdity, a revival of a colonial entity that had been crafted between the 15th and 18th centuries. Tuđman states, "Izetbegović, as the president of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is aware of his helplessness in the face of the Serbian movement dismantling Bosnia. Similarly, he is cognizant of the unrest among the Croatian Herzegovinians regarding this particular situation" (Lovrenović and Lucić 2005: 11).

Towards the close of the same year, during a meeting between Tuđman and a delegation from the Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Zagreb on December 27, 1991, Tuđman took a step further by asserting that the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina had no prospects. He advanced the belief that, in addition to Herceg-Bosna and Posavina, Croatia would also annex the regions of Cazinska and Bihaćka Krajina, as assured to him by Milošević. "This would be practically optimal for fulfilling Croatian national interests, not only in the present but for the future as well. From the remaining part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the

Muslims and a portion of Catholic Croats could establish a small state around Sarajevo, reminiscent of the historical entity of Bosnia. It would function as a buffer between Serbia and Croatia, naturally leaning more heavily towards Croatia under such circumstances” (Lovrenović and Lucić 2005: 87), articulated Tuđman.

Hrvoje Šarinić, the former head of the Office of President Franjo Tuđman of the Republic of Croatia, held secret meetings with the Serbian President on as many as 13 occasions between 1993 and 1995. This is extensively documented in his book titled “All My Secret Negotiations with Slobodan Milošević 1993-1995”. Šarinić actively participated in all significant sessions during which the demarcation lines between Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were delineated. The dialogues between the two leaders were personally arranged by Šarinić through Slobodan Milošević’s Chief of Staff, Goran Milinović. An uncertainty exists in Šarinić’s accounts regarding whether the meeting took place on March 25 or 26, 1991.

Despite this, Šarinić leans toward March 26. In his brief reflection, he recalls that Tuđman and Milošević engaged in a two-and-a-half-hour conversation while strolling through the forests of Karadorđevo. Šarinić is convinced that the division of Bosnia was indeed discussed during this meeting, and he deems it nearly certain. Additionally, he believes that the topic was addressed more substantively during their encounter in Tikveš, near Osijek, on April 15, 1991. During this Tikveš meeting, Šarinić asserts, Milošević and Tuđman spent considerably more time alone. He suggests that the Tikveš meeting, although less publicized, holds more significance than the Karadorđevo meeting. Šarinić is confident that the central theme of the Tikveš encounter was the question of Bosnia’s partition. He emphasizes that during the Tikveš meeting, Milošević was much more direct, employing a rather coarse approach in his attempt to split Bosnia (Dnevni avaz 2011).

Indeed, Presidents Tuđman and Milošević convened once more, specifically on the 15th of April, 1991, in Tikveš, Baranja (Šarinić 1999). In a statement issued by the Office of the President of the Republic of Croatia, it is conveyed that on Monday, a discussion was held in the border region between the two republics, involving the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tuđman, and President of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević. Deliberations encompassed matters related to the Yugoslav state-political crisis, as well as issues concerning the relationship between the two republics. Perspectives were exchanged on the outcomes of collaborative efforts undertaken by the joint group of experts established by Presidents Dr. Franjo Tuđman and Slobodan Milošević, aimed at finding resolutions for outstanding matters in Croatian-Serbian relations and the relations between the two republics. In

the context of the peaceful and democratic resolution of the Yugoslav state-legal crisis, which also entails the implementation of a referendum, the two presidents concurred on the imperative of ensuring the respect of the interests of the Croatian and Serbian peoples as a whole, and the avoidance of any form of coercive action. The two presidents are in agreement to continue mutual discussions, as well as discussions at the level of joint expert groups, and they have also initiated an initiative for talks between the delegation of the Croatian Parliament (Sabor) and the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia (Vjesnik 1991).

The divergent interpretations presented by various newspapers, underscore the intricate nature of the diplomatic maneuvers and underlying political motivations that defined the Karadžorđevo meeting. This media-driven discourse reached beyond national confines, resonating throughout the Balkan region and potentially molding international perceptions of the ongoing crisis. The media's capability to spotlight key political figures and critically assess their actions, alongside its power to amplify specific narratives, significantly augmented its role within the broader political landscape. The analyses and assumptions offered by media outlets not only illuminated the complex interactions among political leaders but also accentuated the interplay between media portrayal, public discourse, and the overarching political agenda. The media coverage of the Karadžorđevo meeting can be seen as a convergence of the realms of politics and journalism, exercising substantial influence in shaping the trajectory of the Yugoslav crisis. This explanation highlights the media's multifaceted role in shaping public opinion and constructing social reality. As part of the broader social system, the media plays a pivotal role in influencing public perceptions, which, in turn, contribute to the collective understanding of the ongoing events. This concept resonates with the ideas of Niklas Luhmann (1995), a prominent sociologist, who discussed how different components of society, including the media, interact and intertwine to construct a unified social system. The media's role in shaping public opinion and intertwining with other societal sectors further emphasizes its significance in influencing political and social dynamics.

This sequence of events underscores the dynamic and intricate nature of the political developments during the time frame encompassing the Karadžorđevo meeting. The swift succession of significant gatherings and the mounting tensions within this period highlights the rapidly evolving landscape of regional and international relations. As the leaders of diverse Yugoslav republics engaged in these pivotal meetings, the intricate interplay of their actions, decisions, and discourse bore immense implications not only for their respective regions but also for the broader Yugoslav context.

The Karadžević meeting served as a focal point that ignited a chain reaction of diplomatic, geopolitical, and socio-political repercussions. The intensifying tensions before, during, and after this meeting revealed the underlying complexities of power dynamics, ethnonational interests, and the ever-present specter of secession and division.

The deliberations and interactions of these leaders transcended mere political engagements, resonating deeply within the fabric of public perception and societal cohesion. The interweaving of their statements, confrontations, and allegations created a tapestry of narratives that shaped not only how their constituencies viewed the unfolding events but also how international observers construed the Yugoslav crisis. The aftermath of the Karadžević meeting saw a surge in discourse, both within the media and diplomatic circles, as competing interpretations vied for prominence. This multifaceted discourse reverberated across borders and within the region, further accentuating the complexity of the issues at hand. In essence, the period around the Karadžević meeting marked a critical phase of shifting alliances, emerging ideologies, and the crystallization of deeply entrenched divisions. The culmination of these events serves as a pivotal turning point that illuminated the contours of a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape, ultimately shaping the trajectory of the Yugoslav crisis in a profound and enduring manner.

EXPERT TEAMS AND DISCUSSIONS ON THE PARTITION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

During the negotiations held in Karadžević, President Tuđman and President Milošević reached a mutual agreement to establish two expert teams with the objective of deliberating on the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The composition of these teams, consisting of advisors and professors, was made public through media outlets. The Croatian team included President Tuđman's advisors, namely Josip Šentija and Dušan Bilandžić, along with Professor Zvonko Lerotić from University of Zagreb and Smiljko Sokol. On the other hand, the Serbian team comprised the advisors of President Milošević, including academician Kosta Mihajlović and Vladan Kutlešić, alongside Professors Ratko Marković and Smilja Avramov from the University of Belgrade (Cohen 1995). Dr. Bilandžić, a member of the Croatian expert team, provides a detailed account of the proceedings and substance of these negotiations in his book titled *Povijest izbliza: Memoarski zapisi 1945-2005* (Bilandžić 2006). In his narrative, he elucidates how the division of Bosnia not only represented

one of the principal personal preoccupations but also a persistent strategic state plan devised by Dr. Franjo Tuđman. Bilandžić reveals that he was invited by President Tuđman to participate in the Croatian team responsible for discussing the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This invitation was extended following the prior agreement in principle on the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina reached between Milošević and Tuđman during the Karadžević meeting on March 25, 1991. Although Bilandžić had initially held optimistic expectations for the progress of Bosnia and Herzegovina, he asserts that he would never have willingly embraced the undertaking of dividing the region. However, he decided to accept the challenge based on his conviction that this endeavour would ultimately prove unsuccessful, firmly believing that Bosnia and Herzegovina could neither be nor should be partitioned (Bilandžić 2006).

The first meeting of the expert teams took place on April 10, 1991, in Tikveš, Baranja (Ibidem). During this meeting, Josip Šentija presented the thesis that the key to solving the Yugoslav crisis lies in the relations between Croatia and Serbia. Kosta Mihajlović supported this view and suggested that restoring the old federation would be the best choice. In response, Zvonko Lerotić argued that federations function effectively only in mono-national communities (Ibidem). Mihajlović rejected the idea of a confederation, seeing it as a pathway to the creation of independent states. Šentija proposed that it is legitimate for both Croats and Serbs to desire their own national states, and Mihajlović declared that Serbia would not obstruct the creation of a Croatian national state. Lerotić agreed with the Serbian perspective that Yugoslavia did not adequately represent the interests of either Serbia or Croatia, and he also concurred that the Federal Government should be overthrown (Ibidem).

At the subsequent meeting held on April 13, 1991, in the government villa Botić in Belgrade, it was agreed to continue the talks in three days instead of ten. Kosta Mihajlović opened the meeting by emphasising the importance of establishing the borders of both future Serbia and future Croatia. He argued that the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina was dictated by common interests and represented a potentially historic opportunity. Lerotić supported Mihajlović's theses, while Smilja Avramov expressed concerns about the perceived threat posed by Muslims, particularly those connected to global Islam, whom she believed posed a danger to both Serbs and Croats. Avramov referenced a NATO study group's identification of Balkan Muslims as bridgeheads for Asia's penetration into Europe. Mihajlović contended that Muslims were displacing both Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and he emphasised that any narrowing of Bosnia and Herzegovina with it remaining a republic was not an option (Ibidem).

In response, Bilandžić questioned the notion that NATO would support an attack on Muslims, pointing out that Turkey, a longstanding member of the NATO pact, would likely protest such an idea. Šentija welcomed Serbia's acknowledgment that Serbs and Croats did not necessarily have to live together, but he also raised the issue of Kninska Krajina and sought Serbia's position on this contentious matter. The Croats unanimously rejected discussions about "Krajina" and adamantly asserted that they would not relinquish any land from present-day Croatia. The Serbs argued that the right to self-determination belonged to the citizens rather than the republics, prompting the Croats to raise the question of applying that principle to Albanians in Kosovo and Hungarians in Vojvodina. The Serbs countered by claiming that Albanians and Hungarians, as non-South Slavic peoples, did not have the right to express themselves. The debate continued, with Bilandžić pressing for Serbia's stance on accepting the borders of Banovina Croatia as a basis for an agreement, to which Smilja Avramov categorically refused. In the midst of the polemical discussion, Bilandžić inquired how Serbia would maintain communication with the majority of the Serbian population located in western Bosnia in the event of the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, suggesting that Bosnian Krajina would become akin to Nagorno-Karabakh or East Pakistan (Ibidem).

The Serbs responded by asserting their claim over the entire region of Posavina, citing an agreement reached between the two presidents. They argue that since Posavina belongs to Serbia, there is no need for a corridor, as Posavina would serve as the connection between Serbia and western Serbian land. Additionally, the Serbs propose population exchanges as a solution, suggesting the possibility of relocating Muslims from Cazinska Krajina to Knin. When directly questioned by Dušan Bilandžić, the Serbs state that Baranja does not belong to Croatia. They also request that "Krajina" should have an outlet to the Adriatic near Obrovac. Bilandžić strongly condemns this proposal, deeming it reminiscent of the Chetnik movement and the events of the Second World War. Surprisingly, the Serbs do not display anger in response. Bilandžić further raises the question of Muslim self-declaration, using the example of a municipality with 50 percent Muslims, 30 percent Croats, and 20 percent Serbs, asking to whom it would belong. The response is: "Muslims don't count – so it belongs to Croats" (Bilandžić 2006: 376).

The third round of talks took place on April 20, 1991, at Villa Weiss in Zagreb (Ibidem). Kosta Mihajlović emphasises the thesis that Yugoslavia was established by two Croats, Tito and Šubašić, and one Slovene, Kardelj, with the intention of undermining Serbia. He argues that Bosnia and Herzegovina was created against the inter-

ests of both Serbs and Croats. Mihajlović discusses Turkey's alleged plan to resettle four million Muslims from Asia Minor in Bosnia and Herzegovina, presenting this information as having been shared with both presidents. He claims that the Muslims in BiH intend to declare Bosnia a Jamahiriya on September 15, and highlights the significant number of Serbs (1,958,000) and Croats (1,281,000) residing outside their respective republics, suggesting that BiH must be divided. Although the teams engaged in three rounds of talks, each lasting approximately ten hours, no agreement was reached due to disagreements over territorial claims, majority populations in specific cities, and related issues (Bilandžić 2006: 377).

STATEMENTS AND INVOLVEMENT OF KEY FIGURES

Josip Manolić, a former Croatian Prime Minister and Speaker of the Parliament, provides insights into the talks in Karadžorđevo regarding the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Tuathail and Dahlman 2004). He asserts that Croatian President Franjo Tuđman spearheaded the policy of dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the goal of realising the Banovina of Croatia. Manolić highlights that Tuđman aimed to incorporate western Herzegovina into Croatia due to its ethnic purity and territorial proximity to Croatia (Index.hr 2006). Manolić's testimony regarding the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, agreed upon in April 1991 in Karadžorđevo by Presidents Tuđman and Milošević, was confirmed during the Hague Court (ICTY) trial of former leaders of Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna (The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 2006). He stands by his statement about the Karadžorđevo meeting, emphasising the role of President Tuđman in the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Manolić reveals that after the meeting, Tuđman and Milošević established expert commissions tasked with preparing documents for the implementation of the agreed-upon division. Academician Dušan Bilandžić led the commission in Croatia, as entrusted by Tuđman (The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 2006). Manolić further asserts that Tuđman's policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina was executed by the "Herzegovinian lobby" within the HDZ party, represented by figures such as Gojko Šušak, Vice Vukojević, Ivić Pašalić, Mate Boban, and Dario Kordić, along with Bosnian Croat leaders (The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 2006). He acknowledges that the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a flawed policy, as expanding territory without encroaching on another country's territory is impossible, illogical, and unsustainable (The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 2006).

Stipe Mesić, the former President of the Presidency of the Yugoslavia and later President of the Republic of Croatia, played a crucial role in the talks held in Karađorđevo. Mesić testified before the Hague Tribunal for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, providing important insights into the discussions between Franjo Tuđman and Slobodan Milošević. He revealed that he organised the first meeting between Tuđman and Milošević in Karađorđevo in March 1991 (The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 2002a). According to Mesić, the initial objective of the meeting was to prevent war, and participants were expected to include Mesić, Tuđman, Milošević, and Borisav Jović. However, Tuđman informed Mesić that only he and Milošević would meet in Karađorđevo, excluding Jović and Mesić. Mesić expressed his concerns about the meeting's location, as Karađorđevo held negative historical connotations. Nevertheless, Tuđman insisted that the meeting had to take place and that it did not matter where they met. Upon Tuđman's return, Mesić recalled him being happy and stating that Milošević agreed to allocate certain territories, such as Banovina and parts of Western Bosnia (Kladuša and Bihać), to Croatia (The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 2002b). Mesić questioned the logic behind Milošević's agreement, as it seemed irrational for Serbia to wage war in Bosnia while Croatia gained territory without engaging in conflict (The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 1998). Mesić's testimony suggests that the initiative for the partition of Bosnia originated from Milošević, and Tuđman's responsibility lies in accepting and participating in the planning of the partition, ultimately leading to the Bosnian war and its long-term consequences for Serbs, Croats, and Muslims (Balkan Transitional Justice 2022).

In an interview with Radio Slobodna Evropa in 2008, Mesić revealed that he initiated the conversation in response to the escalating tensions in Croatia caused by the arming of Serbs by the Yugoslav People's Army (Radio Slobodna Evropa 2008). Mesić recounted a conversation with Borisav Jović, who suggested that the Serbs in Croatia were Mesić's citizens and he could do whatever he wanted with them, even suggesting impalement. Mesić understood that the Serbs in Croatia were being used as a conduit to transfer the war to Bosnia and Herzegovina. He proposed to Jović that they try to solve the problem peacefully and suggested organising a meeting between Tuđman, Milošević, Jović, and himself (Radio Slobodna Evropa 2008). Mesić obtained Milošević's consent for the meeting, and Tuđman also agreed to meet privately in Karađorđevo in March 1991. Tuđman excluded Mesić from the meeting, as did Milošević with Jović. When Tuđman returned, he expressed enthusiasm, stating that he had reached an agreement with Milošević. According to Mesić, Tuđman claimed

that Croatia would receive territories such as Banovina, Cazin, Kladaša, and Bihać (Radio Slobodna Evropa 2008). Mesić questioned the possibility of changing borders without war and expressed scepticism about the logic behind such a division. Tuđman dismissed Mesić's concerns, claiming that historical agreements between Serbia and Croatia would be respected by others. Mesić's cooperation with Tuđman gradually faded following this meeting (Radio Slobodna Evropa 2008). Regarding the maps of the partition of Bosnia, Mesić mentioned that during the meeting, only the areas that would belong to Croatia were shown, while the commissions formed later likely discussed the details. Hrvoje Šarinić travelled to Belgrade, and Smilja Avramov came to Zagreb to work on the maps. Mesić speculated that the commissions met in other locations as well. He acknowledged that the partition plans were not unknown (Radio Slobodna Evropa 2008). Mesić's statements highlight the intentions of both Milošević and Tuđman to achieve territorial expansion through the division of Bosnia. They wanted to create a "greater Serbia" and a "greater Croatia" respectively, underestimating the possibility of a peaceful resolution and the international community's response to their plans. The outcome was a war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, driven by territorial ambitions rather than a peaceful partition (Malcolm 1994).

Stjepan Kljuić, former president of HDZ in Bosnia and Herzegovina, provides insights into the discussions surrounding the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He describes the Karadžević agreement as the most shameful moment in Croatian history and asserts that Franjo Tuđman did the agreement. Kljuić recounts a conversation with Tuđman where he mentioned that Milošević offered him Cazinska Krajina, but Kljuić emphasised that the territory did not belong to either of them. He criticises the agreement, stating that Serbia, which had lost the wars in the 1990s, received half of Bosnia as a reward (Deutsche Welle 2011). During a meeting in December 1991 in Zagreb, Kljuić expressed the preference of Bosnian Croats for a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina. He mentions a meeting with Radovan Karadžić where the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina was proposed. Kljuić notes that the Serbian side avoided direct discussions about partition but instead suggested areas with a significant Serbian population should belong to Serbia. He highlights that the proposed division left western Herzegovina to Croatia while Serbia claimed the remaining territory (Lovrenović and Lucić 2005). Kljuić reveals that he rejected negotiating independently and sought a written proposal instead. He suggests that the Serbian side subtly pushed for cantonization, with certain territories being given to Croats, which he would have accepted. Kljuić recalls Tuđman's response, where he argued that demarcation would be more suitable for Croats and proposed a demarcation plan that in-

cluded Croatian territories and parts of the Cazin and Bihac regions. Tuđman envisioned a buffer state between Serbia and Croatia that would rely heavily on Croatia and resemble the historical country of Bosnia (Ibidem).

Ivo Banac, a professor of history at Yale University and member of the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, reveals in an interview with Feral that Tuđman discussed the partition of Bosnia with him on two occasions. The first conversation occurred in September 1990 during Tuđman's visit to the USA and Canada, well before the meeting in Karadžorđevo. Banac recalls Tuđman mentioning that the best solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina was a partition agreement similar to the one achieved by Pavelić and Stojadinović in Argentine emigration in the mid-1950s, where the border between Croatia and Serbia would follow the Bosnia and Neretva rivers, accompanied by a population exchange. The second conversation took place in May 1991, after Karadžorđevo, in Banski dvori in Zagreb. During this meeting, Tuđman referred to Izetbegović as an "Islamic fundamentalist" and emphasised that marking state borders by conquering an Asian power is not appropriate in the late 20th century (Minić 1998).

And finally, Ante Marković, the last president of SFRY, presented interesting details about Karadžorđevo during his testimony as a witness in the proceedings against Slobodan Milošević in The Hague (The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 2003). Marković stated that in March 1991, Tuđman and Milošević met in Karadžorđevo and agreed on two things: the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the removal of Ante Marković himself. Marković opposed these agreements as he was against war and posed an obstacle to their plans (The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 2003). Shortly after the meeting, Marković had private discussions with both Milošević in Belgrade and Tuđman in Zagreb, which lasted for several hours. During these meetings, Milošević expressed frustration with Marković, stating that it was difficult to work with him and reach an agreement, while Tuđman pointed out how quickly they had reached an agreement in Karadžorđevo. Both leaders admitted that they had agreed on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the dismissal of Ante Marković (The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 2003). Regarding Marković's removal, they attributed the proposal to each other and saw no reason to reject it, considering him to be causing trouble. As for the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, they both acknowledged that they had agreed it should be divided between Serbia and Croatia (The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 2003). Marković raised concerns about the implications of such a division, including the mixed population, legal borders, and

international opinion. He questioned whether they had considered the potential bloodshed and the risk of Bosnia and Herzegovina becoming a conflict-ridden region similar to Palestine. Tuđman remarked that Muslims were converted Catholics, while Milošević stated they were converted Orthodox Christians. Tuđman argued that Europe would not allow the existence of a Muslim state in the heart of Europe and that Europe supported the division. Milošević claimed that Bosnia and Herzegovina had no chance of survival as a state in Yugoslavia since it was an artificial creation of Tito (The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 2003). When Marković asked them about the possibility of bloodshed, Tuđman replied, “Bosnia is falling with a whisper,” alluding to the historical saying, and Milošević stated that the division would not be a problem as Serbs and Croats were the majority, leaving an enclave for Muslims. Marković insisted they consider the scenario if their plans did not go as imagined, to which both remained silent. In the end, Milošević commented, “Even if that happens, which I doubt, then we’ll see what we do,” while Tuđman maintained that Marković would see how wrong he was. Marković expressed his disagreement and commitment to fighting against their proposals under any circumstances (The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 2003).

This information highlights the aspirations of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia (Keil 2016), which continue to pose long-term instability in the Balkan region and hinder the normalisation of relations between these new states created from the former Yugoslavia. It is evident that neither side has given up on their goals, despite the significant human cost suffered by the Bosniak, Serbian, and Croatian people in these wars (Miškovska Kajevska 2017). The resolution of these nationalist aspirations and goals is crucial for achieving lasting peace and stability in the region.

EXTERNAL REPERCUSSIONS AND IMPACT

The story of the agreed partition of Bosnia was substantiated internationally by Warren Zimmerman, the former US ambassador in Belgrade from 1989 to 1992. In his article “The Last Ambassador” published in the magazine *Foreign Policy*, Zimmerman (1995) provided a significant testimony based on his personal knowledge of the events during the collapse of the SFRY. Zimmerman highlighted that neither Milošević nor Tuđman made any effort to hide their intentions towards Bosnia from him. Bosnia, as a place where Serbs, Croats, and Muslims had coexisted for centuries, represented an insult and challenge for these two ethnic hegemonists. Tuđman expressed his belief that Bosnia never really existed as a country and should be divided

between Serbia and Croatia. He criticised Izetbegović and the Muslims, accusing them of being dangerous fundamentalists using Bosnia as a training ground to spread their ideology. Zimmerman confronted Tuđman about his unfounded claims against the neighbouring republic and questioned his expectation of Western support while making undisguised territorial claims against Bosnia. Tuđman's response was a surprising statement of trust in Milošević (Ibidem).

Zimmerman further discussed Milošević's calculated strategy for Bosnia, contrasting it with Tuđman's emotional approach. Milošević, after Slovenia and Croatia declared independence and ceased participation in Yugoslav authorities, claimed to be the successor of Yugoslavia and advocated the right of those who wanted to remain in Yugoslavia to do so. He specifically highlighted the demographic distribution, stating that Serbs, who predominantly lived in rural areas and occupied 70% of the land, had the right to it. This laid the foundation for Serbian aspirations in Bosnia several months before the Bosnian Serb army and irregular forces from Serbia disrupted the peace in Bosnia. Milošević consistently emphasised the United States' strong opposition to any attempt by the Serbs to achieve their goals through force (Ibidem).

The information provided regarding the conversations between Milošević and Tuđman in Karadžorđevo in March 1991, as well as the discussions between Lord Carrington, Paddy Ashdown, and Tuđman, highlights the existence of discussions and potential agreements on the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Paddy Ashdown, during a press conference in August 1995, announced that he had seen a map drawn by Tuđman illustrating the partition of Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia. This drawing, made by Tuđman during a gala dinner, was published by the BBC (BBC News 1998) as evidence of a secret agreement between Tuđman and Milošević to redraw Bosnia's borders (Tuathail 2006).

The significance of the information provided lies in the confirmation that Franjo Tuđman, the Croatian president, did not abandon the nationalist program aimed at creating a greater Croatia through the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina in collaboration with Slobodan Milošević, the Serbian president. This corroborates the statements made by various individuals such as Dr. Dušan Bilandžić, Josip Manolić, Stipe Mešić, Stjepan Kljuić, Warren Zimmerman, Lord Carrington, and others, who have also discussed the understanding and potential agreements between Tuđman and Milošević concerning the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, it highlights that Milošević himself did not completely relinquish the Serbian nationalist program of creating a greater Serbia, which also included the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

CONCLUSION

The Karadžorđevo meeting stands as a seminal event within the tumultuous period of the Yugoslav dissolution and the subsequent Bosnian War. When viewed through the prism of communication and political strategy, it offers a compelling case study. As can be seen in the given analysis, this meeting was a microcosm of the complex dynamics and decision-making processes that were characteristic of this era.

In terms of its political backdrop, the meeting occurred against the backdrop of a disintegrating Yugoslavia. The leaders of Serbia and Croatia, Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman, respectively, were central figures in the unfolding drama. Their roles extended beyond their own nations, as their actions and decisions had the potential to shape the destiny of the entire Balkan region. The Karadžorđevo meeting represents an overt attempt to exert influence and dominance in a region already teetering on the precipice of conflict. This backdrop accentuates the high stakes of the meeting and its role in the broader geopolitical landscape. However, the consequences and implications of the Karadžorđevo meeting truly underscore its significance. It is suggested by some analysts and historians that pivotal agreements and plans for the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina may have been forged during this encounter. This notion, if true, would make the meeting a seminal moment in the lead-up to the Bosnian War, contributing significantly to the trajectory of the conflict.

From a communicative standpoint, the Karadžorđevo meeting exemplifies the multifaceted nature of political discourse during times of crisis. Behind the scenes, leaders engaged in a delicate dance of information exchange and diplomacy. The secretive nature of these discussions underscores the tactical nature of communication in such high-stakes contexts. The fact that these exchanges have been documented and made public in various forms highlights the enduring interest in understanding the nuances of political communication during conflict.

The statements shed light on the meeting in Karadžorđevo and its significance in the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the subsequent wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman, as the presidents of Serbia and Croatia, respectively, played pivotal roles as the main actors and initiators of events following their talks and agreements in Karadžorđevo in March 1991. Several conclusions can be drawn from this information:

Firstly, it is evident that the meeting took place when the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia still existed, yet Milošević and Tuđman disregarded its existence and agreed upon the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although Stipe Mesić's

statements about the disappearance of the factors that created SFRY are largely accurate, the Yugoslav federal institutions, including the Presidency and the government, were still in place, and no republics had formally seceded at that time. Despite this, Milošević and Tuđman proceeded with their plans for a “great Serbia” and a “great Croatia” by deciding how to divide the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Secondly, Milošević and Tuđman reached secret agreements on the restructuring of the existing federal state, keeping their intentions hidden from other Yugoslav republics, as well as their own legal leaderships and parties.

Thirdly, the issue of their historical responsibility remains open, and each of them bears responsibility regardless of the extent of their individual contributions to the tragic wars that ensued after the Karadžević meeting.

Fourthly, objective scientific research is crucial in placing the meeting and agreements between Milošević and Tuđman in their proper historical context within the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The intentions behind the meeting may have been to prevent war, but the intention to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina was a malicious and fatal one. Intentions alone cannot absolve the main actors from responsibility, as the consequences of their actions speak for themselves.

Lastly, comprehensive scientific research will provide a definitive and comprehensive understanding of the nature of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It will determine whether they fought for the expansion of Serbian and Croatian territories and the establishment of ethnically homogeneous “Greater Serbia” and “Greater Croatia” with adjusted state borders, or if they arose from deep-seated national intolerance and the inability to coexist peacefully. There are differing opinions, but many argue that the war in Croatia aimed at creating new borders for a reduced Yugoslavia or, more precisely, for the territories and borders of a “greater Serbia,” while the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina sought to divide the region between Serbia and Croatia, leading to the creation of “greater Serbia” and “greater Croatia” with new borders between the expanded states of Serbia and Croatia.

The wars in the former Yugoslavia were characterized by the pursuit of Great Serbian and Great Croatian nationalist programs by the leaders and leaderships of Serbia and Croatia. These wars were driven by the use of force and aggression to solve the Serbian and Croatian national questions. The course of the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina led Milošević, Tuđman, and their close associates to reassess their policies and war goals in relation to Bosnia. The determination of the major powers to preserve Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state within its recognized borders forced

them to abandon their plans for territorial expansion and the creation of “greater Serbia” or “greater Croatia”. The realities of the domestic and international situation, as well as the Dayton and Paris Agreements, compelled them to accept the peace accords and assume the responsibilities outlined in these agreements.

This is why the Karadžorđevo meeting serves as a stark reminder of the intricate interplay of political interests, ethnic tensions, and territorial disputes that characterized this era. It is emblematic of the challenges that emerged as Yugoslavia disintegrated, and competing visions for the future of the region collided. The repercussions of the Karadžorđevo meeting continue to reverberate, both in terms of its impact on regional stability and its role in shaping the contemporary historical narrative of the Balkans.

Despite their subsequent claims as peacemakers, the actions and policies pursued by Milošević and Tuđman after the Karadžorđevo meeting and during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be undone. Historical research into the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the wars in the region confirms the lasting consequences of their big-state nationalist agendas. The Serbian and Croatian people have paid a heavy price for their leaders’ pursuit of these ambitions, leading to internal conflict and warfare, as well as the suffering of the Bosniak people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who were subjected to wars waged by both Serbs and Croats. Numerous historical examples demonstrate that with the passage of time, even the most strained relationships can heal, as verified through experiences in various nations and countries. However, in the context of Croatia and Bosnia, the possibility of healing and fostering good neighbourly relations depends on the reduction of nationalist forces and the emergence of real democratic forces that prioritise the resolution of practical issues and the well-being of their respective peoples. It is crucial for Serbian and Croatian societies to reject big-state nationalist and hegemonic programs, marginalise the political and social forces promoting such ideologies, and create conditions conducive to the development of positive inter-state relations between Serbia and Croatia, as well as Bosnia and its neighbouring countries.

While certain aspects of the Karadžorđevo agreement, such as the creation of Republika Srpska, were partially implemented, Bosnia and Herzegovina remained intact as a whole. However, the lingering spirit of division and the ideas that fueled the agreement persist in various forms. Revivalist sentiments of Croatian self-government, the glorification of Herceg-Bosna, and the echoes of past threats are cause for concern. The statements made by political figures, even nowadays almost thirty years after conflict, resemble those of Slobodan Milošević and Radovan Karadžić. The cur-

rent climate raises worries about the reemergence of ideas that promote the disappearance and division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It will take considerable time for the wounds inflicted upon the Serbian, Croatian, and Bosniak peoples to heal, and the tragic events of the war may never be forgotten.

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ANALIZA DISKURSA I KOMUNIKACIJE SPORAZUMA MILOŠEVIĆ–TUĐMAN: IMPLIKACIJE NA BOSNU I HERCEGOVINU

Sažetak

Susret između Slobodana Miloševića i Franje Tuđmana u Karadorđevu koji je održan marta 1991. godine ima dubok historijski značaj u kontekstu eskalacije tenzija u bivšoj Jugoslaviji. Ovaj rad koristi perspektive komunikologije kako bi sveobuhvatno analizirao sporazum, otkrivajući zamršenu dinamiku pregovora i implikacije na Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Komunikološkom analizom sporazuma Milošević-Tuđman otkrivaju se komunikacijski obrasci, retoričke strategije i implikacijske poruke. Ovaj okvir omogućuje pojašnjenja kako jezik oblikuje percepcije, utiče na odluke i na politički kontekst. Analiza istražuje kontekst sastanka u Karadorđevu, naglašavajući politički razvoj i rastući nacionalizam koji je doveo do pregovora. Koristeći primarne izvore razmatra argumente različitih zainteresovanih strana o postojanju i implikacijama sporazuma. Ispituju se uloge stručnih timova u raspravi o podjeli Bosne i izjave ključnih pojedinaca. Istraživanje nailazi na implicitne poruke, dinamiku moći i nacionalističke diskurse. Rezultati ističu neposredne i dugoročne posljedice sporazuma na Bosnu i Hercegovinu, uključujući njegovu ulogu u ratu u BiH. Obrađuju se kritike, kontroverze i alternativna tumačenja. U zaključku, ovaj rad sumira ključne nalaze, naglašava doprinos nauci i predlaže mogućnosti za buduća istraživanja. Analizom diskursa i komunikacijskom analizom sporazuma Milošević-Tuđman produbljuje se naše razumijevanje složene pregovaračke dinamike tokom kritičnog perioda u historiji Bosne i Hercegovine.

Ključne riječi: sporazum Milošević-Tuđman; analiza diskursa; komunikacijska analiza; raspad Jugoslavije; nacionalizam i tenzije; bosanski rat

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